Хулін 109

מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: כִּי נִיעֵר מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף וְכִסָּה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף – אָסוּר, אַמַּאי? הָא לָא בָּלַע כְּלָל!

The Gemara objects: From Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s acceptance of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion only when one did not stir or cover the pot, one can conclude by inference that Rabbi Yehuda himself maintains that even when one stirred the contents of the pot continuously from beginning to end, i.e., before and after the drop of milk was absorbed, or covered the pot continuously from beginning to end, all the contents of the pot are prohibited. But why should this be so? The first piece of meat did not absorb any more milk than the others. Since the milk definitely diffused evenly through the pot immediately, it should be nullified, assuming that the pot’s contents amount to more than sixty times the milk.

אֵימָא: לֹא נִיעֵר יָפֶה יָפֶה, וְלֹא כִּסָּה יָפֶה יָפֶה.

The Gemara responds: Say that Rabbi Yehuda is stringent because one might not have stirred thoroughly, or he might not have covered the pot thoroughly, and therefore initially the milk might have been absorbed only by the first piece, rendering it prohibited. Afterward, when he does stir thoroughly, that piece of meat renders the other pieces prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not share this concern.

אָמַר מָר, וְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים כְּשֶׁנִּיעֵר וְכִסָּה. מַאי ״נִיעֵר״ וּמַאי ״כִּסָּה״? אִילֵּימָא נִיעֵר בַּסּוֹף וְלֹא נִיעֵר בַּתְּחִלָּה, וְכִסָּה בַּסּוֹף וְלֹא כִּסָּה בַּתְּחִלָּה – הָאָמְרַתְּ נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּהָא! אֶלָּא נִיעֵר מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף, וְכִסָּה מִתְּחִלָּה וְעַד סוֹף.

§ The Gemara returns to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement: The Master said above: And the statement of the Rabbis appears correct in a case where one stirred the pot and covered it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term: Stirred, and what is the meaning of the term: Covered? If we say that he stirred at the end, after the first piece absorbed the milk, and did not stir at the beginning, beforehand, and likewise he covered at the end and did not cover at the beginning, one may respond: Didn’t you already say on the previous amud that the statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears to be correct in this case? Rather, it must be a case where he stirred continuously from beginning to end or covered the pot continuously from beginning to end.

מִכְּלָל דְּרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: נִיעֵר בַּסּוֹף וְלֹא נִיעֵר בַּתְּחִלָּה, כִּסָּה בַּסּוֹף וְלֹא כִּסָּה בַּתְּחִלָּה – מוּתָּר.

If so, one can conclude by inference from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s qualified acceptance of the Rabbis’ opinion that the Rabbis themselves maintain that even when one stirred only at the end and did not stir at the beginning, and similarly if he covered the pot only at the end and did not cover at the beginning, all the contents of the pot are permitted. Even the first piece is permitted, as they hold that the milk it absorbed diffused out of it and throughout the pot.

אַלְמָא קָסָבְרִי אֶפְשָׁר לְסוֹחֳטוֹ מוּתָּר.

Evidently, the Rabbis maintain that an item that can be wrung to remove the forbidden substance is permitted. This illustrates that tanna’im dispute this issue, as according to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, an item that can be wrung to remove the forbidden substance is prohibited.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: מִמַּאי דִּבְאֶפְשָׁר לְסוֹחֳטוֹ פְּלִיגִי? דִּלְמָא אֶפְשָׁר לְסוֹחֳטוֹ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר, וְהָכָא בְּמִין בְּמִינוֹ קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: מִין בְּמִינוֹ לֹא בָּטֵיל, וְרַבָּנַן לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּאָמְרִי: מִין בְּמִינוֹ בָּטֵיל!

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: From where is it derived that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to an item that can be wrung? Perhaps even if an item can be wrung, everyone agrees that it remains prohibited, and here they disagree with regard to whether a type of food mixed with food of its own type can be nullified. And Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he said that a type of food mixed with food of its own type cannot be nullified. And likewise, the Rabbis conform to their standard line of reasoning, as they said that a type of food mixed with food of its own type can be nullified. This is why they maintain that all the meat in the pot is permitted.

הַאי מַאי? אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּרַבָּנַן בְּמִין בְּמִינוֹ הָכָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סְבִירָא לְהוּ, וּבְאֶפְשָׁר לְסוֹחֳטוֹ פְּלִיגִי – הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי: נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּהָא, וְדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים בְּהָא.

Ravina responded: What is this reasoning? Granted, if you say that the Rabbis here hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the issue of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, and they disagree with regard to an item that can be wrung, that is why Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears to be correct in this case, when one did not initially stir or cover the pot, and the statement of the Rabbis appears to be correct in that case, when one did initially stir or cover it, since the issue of when one stirred or covered the pot is relevant to the dispute, as explained above.

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: אֶפְשָׁר לְסוֹחֳטוֹ דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר, וְהָכָא בְּמִין בְּמִינוֹ קָמִיפַּלְגִי – הַאי נִרְאִין דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְאֵין נִרְאִין מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, וְתוּ לָא מִידִּי.

But if you say: Everyone agrees that an item that can be wrung is prohibited, and here they disagree only with regard to a type of food mixed with food of its own type, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi should not phrase his statement as a qualified acceptance of both opinions, which seems arbitrary. Rather, he should have said this: I accept that a type of food is not nullified by a food of its own type. Therefore, the statement of Rabbi Yehuda appears correct where one did not stir initially, as the flavor of the prohibited first piece cannot be nullified; but it does not appear correct where one stirred immediately, since in that case, even the first piece is not prohibited, and I do not share Rabbi Yehuda’s concern that perhaps one did not stir thoroughly. And nothing more need be said.

מַתְנִי׳ הַכְּחָל – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת חֶלְבּוֹ. לֹא קְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו. הַלֵּב – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ, לֹא קְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו.

MISHNA: One who wants to eat the udder of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its milk, and only then is it permitted to cook it. If he did not tear the udder before cooking it, he does not violate the prohibition against cooking and eating meat and milk and does not receive lashes for it, as the halakhic status of the milk in the udder is not that of milk. One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood, and only then may he cook and eat it. If he did not tear the heart before cooking and eating it, he does not violate the prohibition against consuming blood and is not liable to receive karet for it.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב: אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו וּמוּתָּר. וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו – מִיעְבָּר הוּא דְּלָא עָבַר, הָא אִיסּוּרָא אִיכָּא!

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one did not tear the udder of a slaughtered animal before cooking it he does not violate the biblical prohibition against eating meat and milk. Rabbi Zeira says that Rav says: He does not violate the prohibition, and it is altogether permitted to eat the cooked product ab initio. The Gemara objects: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: He does not violate the prohibition, i.e., he is not held liable after the fact. One can infer from here as follows: He does not violate a prohibition by Torah law, but there is nevertheless a prohibition ab initio by rabbinic law.

בְּדִין הוּא דְּאִיסּוּרָא נָמֵי לֵיכָּא, וְאַיְּידֵי דִּבְעָא לְמִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא: הַלֵּב קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ, לֹא קְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו. הָתָם מִיעְבָּר הוּא דְּלָא עָבַר, הָא אִיסּוּרָא אִיכָּא, תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו.

The Gemara explains: By right the mishna should have taught that there is no prohibition here by rabbinic law either. But the tanna of the mishna uses this language since he wants to teach in the latter clause: One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood, but if he did not tear the heart before cooking and eating it, he does not violate the prohibition. There it is true that although he does not violate a prohibition by Torah law there is a prohibition by rabbinic law. To preserve linguistic symmetry, he teaches the first clause in this manner as well, stating: He does not violate the prohibition.

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: הַכְּחָל – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת חֶלְבּוֹ, לֹא קְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו. הַלֵּב – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ, לֹא קְרָעוֹ – קוֹרְעוֹ לְאַחַר בִּשּׁוּלוֹ וּמוּתָּר. לֵב הוּא דְּבָעֵי קְרִיעָה, אֲבָל כְּחָל לָא בָּעֵי קְרִיעָה.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports this opinion: One who wants to eat the udder of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its milk. If he did not tear the udder before cooking it, he does not violate the prohibition against cooking and eating meat and milk and does not receive lashes for it. One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood. If he did not tear the heart before cooking and eating it, he tears it after its cooking, and it is permitted. One can infer from the baraita that it is only the heart that requires tearing after cooking if it was not torn beforehand. But the udder does not require tearing after being cooked unlawfully. Evidently, it is permitted as is.

דִּלְמָא לֵב הוּא דְּסַגִּי לֵיהּ בִּקְרִיעָה, אֲבָל כְּחָל – לָא סַגִּי לֵיהּ בִּקְרִיעָה.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps one should infer the opposite, that tearing after cooking is sufficient only to render the heart permitted, as the heart does not absorb blood through cooking. But tearing after cooking is not sufficient to render the udder permitted, as the meat of the udder absorbs the milk through cooking, and tearing will not remove the absorbed milk.

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב: אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו, וְאָסוּר. לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: ״אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו״ – מִיעְבָּר הוּא דְּלָא עָבַר, הָא אִיסּוּרָא אִיכָּא.

And some say a different version of the above exchange, based on a different version of Rav’s statement: Rabbi Zeira says that Rav says: If one does not tear the udder of a slaughtered animal before cooking it, he does not violate the Torah prohibition, but it is prohibited to eat the cooked product by rabbinic law. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna supports this opinion, as it states: He does not violate the prohibition, indicating that although he does not violate a Torah prohibition and is not flogged, there is nevertheless a prohibition by rabbinic law.

בְּדִין הוּא דְּאִיסּוּרָא נָמֵי לֵיכָּא, וְאַיְּידֵי דִּבְעָא לְמִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא: הַלֵּב קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ, לֹא קְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו, דְּהָתָם מִיעְבָּר הוּא דְּלָא עָבַר, הָא אִיסּוּרָא אִיכָּא, תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא ״אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו״.

The Gemara responds: By right the mishna should have taught that there is not even a prohibition by rabbinic law. But the tanna of the mishna uses this language since he wants to teach the latter clause: One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood, but if he did not tear the heart before cooking and eating it, he does not violate the prohibition for it. There, it is true that although he does not violate a Torah prohibition there is a prohibition by rabbinic law. He therefore teaches in the first clause in this manner as well, stating: He does not violate the prohibition for it.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַכְּחָל – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת חֶלְבּוֹ, לֹא קְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ עוֹבֵר עָלָיו. הַלֵּב – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ, לֹא קְרָעוֹ – קוֹרְעוֹ לְאַחַר בִּשּׁוּלוֹ, וּמוּתָּר. לֵב הוּא דְּבָעֵי קְרִיעָה, אֲבָל כְּחָל – לָא בָּעֵי קְרִיעָה!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: One who wants to eat the udder of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its milk. If he did not tear the udder before cooking it, he does not violate the prohibition for it. One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood. If he did not tear the heart before cooking and eating it, he tears it after its cooking, and it is permitted. One can infer from the baraita that it is only the heart that requires tearing after cooking if it was not torn beforehand, but the udder does not require tearing after being cooked unlawfully. Evidently, it is permitted as is.

דִּלְמָא לֵב הוּא דְּסַגִּי לֵיהּ בִּקְרִיעָה, אֲבָל כְּחָל לָא סַגִּי לֵיהּ בִּקְרִיעָה.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps one should infer the opposite, that tearing after cooking is sufficient only to render the heart permitted, as the heart does not absorb blood through cooking. But tearing it after cooking is not sufficient to render the udder permitted, as the meat of the udder absorbs the milk through cooking, and tearing will not remove the absorbed milk. This concludes the second version of the Gemara’s discussion.

תַּנְיָא כְּלִישְׁנָא קַמָּא דְּרַב: כְּחָל שֶׁבִּשְּׁלוֹ בַּחֲלָבוֹ – מוּתָּר, קֵבָה שֶׁבִּשְּׁלָהּ בַּחֲלָבָהּ – אָסוּר.

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the first version of Rav’s statement: An udder that one cooked, i.e., roasted, in its milk is permitted. By contrast, the stomach of a suckling lamb or calf that one cooked, i.e., roasted, together with the milk it contains is prohibited for consumption.

וּמָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לָזֶה? זֶה כָּנוּס בְּמֵעָיו, וְזֶה אֵין כָּנוּס בְּמֵעָיו.

The baraita explains: And what is the distinction between this stomach and that udder? The milk this calf suckled was considered milk the moment it left the mother’s teat, and it was merely collected in the calf’s innards. But that milk in the udder is not defined as milk, since it was never collected in the animal’s innards from outside but is found in the flesh. Consequently, this meat of the udder is not prohibited if it is roasted with the milk it contains, although one should still tear it by rabbinic law ab initio.

כֵּיצַד קוֹרְעוֹ? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: קוֹרְעוֹ שְׁתִי וָעֵרֶב, וְטָחוֹ בַּכּוֹתֶל. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לְשַׁמָּעֵיהּ: קְרַע לִי, וַאֲנָא אֵיכוֹל. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? מַתְנִיתִין הִיא! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן שְׁתִי וָעֵרֶב וְטָחוֹ בַּכּוֹתֶל.

§ The Gemara inquires: How must one tear an udder before cooking it? Rav Yehuda says: One tears it lengthwise and widthwise [sheti va’erev] and smears it against a wall to remove all the milk. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Elazar said to his attendant: Tear an udder for me before you roast it, and I will eat it. The Gemara asks: What is this episode teaching us? It is explicitly stated in the mishna that one must do this. The Gemara answers: This story teaches us that according to Rabbi Elazar we do not require one to tear it lengthwise and widthwise and smear it against a wall. Rather, it is enough simply to tear it once, either lengthwise or widthwise.

אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ יַלְתָּא לְרַב נַחְמָן: מִכְּדֵי, כֹּל דַּאֲסַר לַן רַחֲמָנָא שְׁרָא לַן כְּוָותֵיהּ, אֲסַר לַן דְּמָא – שְׁרָא לַן כַּבְדָּא, נִדָּה – דַּם טוֹהַר.

§ Yalta said to her husband Rav Naḥman: Now as a rule, for any item that the Merciful One prohibited to us, He permitted to us a similar item. He prohibited to us the consumption of blood, yet He permitted to us the consumption of liver, which is filled with blood and retains the taste of blood. Likewise, God prohibited sexual intercourse with a menstruating woman, but permitted sexual intercourse with one’s wife while she discharges the blood of purity. During a particular period after giving birth, even if she experiences a flow of blood she is not rendered ritually impure and remains permitted to her husband by Torah law.

חֵלֶב בְּהֵמָה – חֵלֶב חַיָּה, חֲזִיר – מוֹחָא דְּשִׁיבּוּטָא, גֵּירוּתָא – לִישָּׁנָא דִּכְוָורָא.

Furthermore, the Torah prohibits the consumption of the forbidden fat of a domesticated animal, but permitted the fat of an undomesticated animal, which has the same flavor. It is prohibited to eat pork, but one may eat the brain of a shibuta fish, which has a similar taste. One may not eat giruta, a non-kosher fish, but one may eat the tongue of a fish, which tastes similar.

אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ – גְּרוּשָׁה בְּחַיֵּי בַעְלָהּ, אֵשֶׁת אָח – יְבָמָה, גּוֹיָה – יְפַת תֹּאַר, בָּעֵינַן לְמֵיכַל בִּשְׂרָא בַּחֲלָבָא.

Likewise, the Torah prohibits sexual intercourse with the wife of another man but permitted one to marry a divorced woman in her previous husband’s lifetime. The Torah prohibits sexual intercourse with one’s brother’s wife, and yet it permits one to marry his yevama, i.e., his brother’s widow when the brother dies childless. Finally, the Torah prohibits sexual intercourse with a gentile woman but permitted one to marry a beautiful woman who is a prisoner of war (see Deuteronomy 21:10–14). Yalta concluded: The Torah prohibits the consumption of meat cooked in milk; I wish to eat a dish that tastes like meat cooked in milk.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב נַחְמָן לְטַבָּחֵי: זַוִּיקוּ לַהּ כַּחְלֵי. וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: קוֹרְעוֹ! הָהוּא לִקְדֵרָה.

Upon hearing this, Rav Naḥman said to his cooks: Roast udders on a spit for her. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that one must tear the udder first? Rav Naḥman did not tell his cooks to tear the udders. The Gemara answers: That requirement was stated only with regard to cooking in a pot, not roasting.

וְהָא קָתָנֵי: שֶׁבִּשְּׁלוֹ – דִּיעֲבַד אִין, לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא? הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא קֵבָה

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the baraita cited above: An udder that one cooked in its milk is permitted? This indicates that after the fact, yes, it is permitted, but one may not roast it ab initio without tearing it. The Gemara answers: The same is true even of roasting ab initio, i.e., it is permitted, and the tanna of the baraita uses this language since he wants to teach in the latter clause: A stomach