Meilà 4

וְהָא קָתָנֵי: אִם אֲחֵרִים מֵבִיא לִידֵי פִּיגּוּל, הוּא עַצְמוֹ לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!

With regard to Rava’s answer to Rav Ashi, the Gemara objects: But didn’t Ulla teach in justification of his opinion: If the taking of this handful brings others, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, into a status of piggul, by means of the intent to consume it after its appointed time, with regard to the handful itself, is it not all the more so that it should be rendered piggul by this intent? If so, the same should likewise apply in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity that was slaughtered with the intent to consume it after its appointed time, i.e., it should be rendered piggul by this intent alone, regardless of intent during sprinkling.

הָא נָמֵי, אִיסּוּרָא דְּמַיְיתֵי לִידֵי פִּיגּוּל.

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as in this instance, as well, Ulla did not mean that it is full-fledged piggul by intent with regard to the taking of the handful alone. Rather, he meant that a prohibited act was performed upon it which brings it to a status of piggul, but the full status of piggul is attained only if there is also an improper intent at the time of the sacrificing of the handful.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְהָאָמַר אִילְפָא: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת,

There is a dispute in a mishna (Zevaḥim 29b) with regard to two consecutive improper intentions. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that if there first was intent to partake of an offering or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, which renders it piggul and therefore one who consumes it would be liable to receive karet, and then there was intent to perform that act outside its designated area, which merely disqualifies the offering, it is piggul. But if the order is reversed, it is merely disqualified. The Rabbis rule that in either case it is only disqualified. With that mishna in mind, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But doesn’t Ilfa say: This disagreement applies in a case where the different intentions occurred during the performance of two different sacrificial rites?

כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר ״הֲרֵינִי שׁוֹחֵט סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וְסִימָן שֵׁנִי חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ״, אֲבָל בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עֵירוּבֵי מַחְשָׁבוֹת הֲוַאי!

Ilfa elaborated: For example, if one said: I am hereby slaughtering the first one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., either the trachea or the esophagus, with the intention of consuming the offering beyond its designated time; and he then slaughtered its second organ with the intention of consuming it outside its designated area, then these halakhot apply. But if both intentions occurred in the course of one rite, e.g., during the slaughtering of the same organ, then everyone, including Rabbi Yehuda, agrees that this constitutes a mixture of intentions, and the offering is not rendered piggul. This example indicates that slaughtering alone with intent beyond its designated time renders the offering piggul, contrary to the opinion of Rav Giddel.

הָכִי נָמֵי, לְכִי זָרֵיק תִּיגַּלֵּי מִילְּתָא. אִי בַּעֲבוֹדָה אַחַת, אִי בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת.

Rav Ashi answered Ravina: Indeed, Rav Giddel agrees with this ruling. Although he maintains that slaughtering alone does not render an offering piggul, nevertheless, he agrees that when the blood is sprinkled afterward with piggul intent, it will be revealed whether there was piggul intent in the course of one rite or two rites. Consequently, if both intentions occurred during one sacrificial rite, everyone agrees that the offering is not piggul, despite the fact that the sprinkling was performed with piggul intent. But if the two intentions took place during two different sacrificial rites, then the question of whether it is piggul or merely disqualified is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. Yet, the offering cannot be established as piggul until after the sprinkling.

אִי הָכִי, גַּבֵּי תוֹדָה נָמֵי, עַד דְּזָרֵיק!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, with regard to a thanks offering, where it is stated that if the priest slaughtered it with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time, then the loaves are sanctified (see 3b), the intention only at the time of the slaughtering should also not render the offering piggul until the blood is sprinkled. Since the mishna is apparently referring to a regular case of piggul, it must be speaking of a situation where the sprinkling was also performed with the piggul intent, which is how Ilfa explained the mishna on Zevaḥim 29b. If so, according to Rav Giddel, who maintains that slaughtering with the intent of piggul does not bring offerings of lesser sanctity into the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse, how could the loaves be considered sanctified?

מַאי ״קָדַשׁ״ – לִיפָּסֵל, דְּבָעֵי שְׂרֵיפָה.

The Gemara explains: What does the mishna mean when it says that the loaves are considered sanctified? It does not mean that they are sanctified in the sense that they are subject to the halakhot of misuse. Rather, it means that they are sanctified to the extent that they have the possibility to be disqualified, to the extent that they require burning afterward.

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: הַפִּיגּוּל לְעוֹלָם מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ. לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיזְּרִיק דָּם, וּמְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ!

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports the opinion of Rav Giddel: With regard to an offering that is piggul, one who derives benefit from it is always liable for misuse of consecrated property. Does this not mean that the meat of an offering of the most sacred order is subject to the halakhot of misuse even though its blood was sprinkled with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time? And if so, this supports Rav Giddel’s opinion.

לָא, דְּלֹא זָרַק הַדָּם. אִי דְּלֹא זָרַק הַדָּם, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא?

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita, as it is possible that the baraita is referring to a case where the priest did not yet sprinkle the blood, and that is why the offering is subject to the halakhot of misuse. But once the blood is sprinkled with improper intent, the offering is no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse. The Gemara asks: If the baraita is dealing with a case where the priest did not yet sprinkle the blood, what is the purpose of stating it? Certainly before its blood is sprinkled the offering is included in the category of “the sacred items of the Lord,” and is subject to the halakhot of misuse.

אֶלָּא: לְעוֹלָם דְּזָרֵיק, וְכִי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא, בְּעוֹלָה. אִי בְּעוֹלָה, פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּגָבוֹהַּ הִיא כּוּלַּהּ.

The Gemara suggest an alternative reason for rejecting the suggestion: Rather, the baraita is actually referring to a case where the blood was sprinkled. But nevertheless, it does not support Rav Giddel’s opinion, as when that baraita is taught, it is referring to a burnt offering. A burnt offering is always subject to the halakhot of misuse even after its blood is sprinkled, as it is never permitted to the priests in consumption. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the ruling of the baraita is stated with regard to a burnt offering, then it is obvious that it is still subject to the halakhot of misuse, as it entirely belongs to the Most High, i.e., the entire offering is burned on the altar and none of it is consumed by the owners or priests.

וְעוֹד, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: לָן דָּמָהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָזַר וּזְרָקוֹ – מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ.

And furthermore, one may cite proof for the opinion of Rav Giddel from that baraita, as the latter clause of the baraita teaches: If its blood was left overnight instead of being sprinkled on the altar on the day it was slaughtered, even though the priest later sprinkled it on the following day, nevertheless, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּחַטָּאת – שַׁפִּיר.

The Gemara analyzes this statement of the baraita: Granted, if you say that the baraita is referring to a sin offering, then it is well. Since the blood was disqualified for sprinkling by being left overnight, it does not become permitted to the priests even after the blood is sprinkled, and is therefore subject to the halakhot of misuse. But if the blood had not been left overnight, the offering would not be subject to the halakhot of misuse, as the sprinkling would have removed the sin offering from that category due to the fact that it became permitted for the priests.

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּעוֹלָה – צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר?

But if you say that the baraita is referring to a burnt offering, does it need to be said that it is still subject to the halakhot of misuse? A burnt offering remains subject to the halakhot of misuse even if the blood had not been left overnight and the sprinkling was performed properly, as it never becomes permitted to the priests.

סֵיפָא וַדַּאי מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ. רֵישָׁא, מַאי? הוֹאִיל וּמְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ סֵיפָא, מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ נָמֵי רֵישָׁא?

The Gemara comments: The latter clause of the baraita certainly supports the opinion of Rav Giddel, as it clearly shows that an unfit sprinkling does not remove an offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse. But with regard to the first clause of the baraita, what does it teach concerning the opinion of Rav Giddel? Is it reasonable to say that since the latter clause of the baraita supports the opinion of Rav Giddel, the earlier clause, which states that piggul is always subject to the halakhot of misuse, also supports his opinion?

סֵיפָא לָאו וַדַּאי מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: מַאי שְׁנָא הֲלָנָה – דְּקָעָבֵיד בְּיָדַיִם, לָא מַהְנֵי זְרִיקָה לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִידֵי מְעִילָה.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is not even certain that the latter clause supports Rav Giddel, as it is possible that although the sprinkling of blood that was left overnight does not remove an offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse, nevertheless, sprinkling after piggul does achieve this. The Gemara clarifies: What is the difference between the two cases? The difference is with regard to leaving the blood overnight, where it is performed in relation to an action, i.e., the priest failed to act in the proper manner, sprinkling the blood is not effective to remove the offering from the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse.

מַחְשָׁבָה – לָא קָא עָבֵיד בְּיָדַיִם, מַהְנֵי לֵיהּ זְרִיקָה לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִידֵי מְעִילָה.

By contrast, in the case of sprinkling after piggul, where the disqualification is merely a function of intent, which is not performed in relation to an action, perhaps sprinkling the blood is effective to remove the offering from the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse.

לֵימָא הָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: הַפִּיגּוּל בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים – מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ. לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דְּזָרַק וּמְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ! לָא, דְּלֹא זָרַק.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this baraita supports the opinion of Rav Giddel: With regard to an offering of the most sacred order that is piggul, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property.Does this not mean that it is subject to the halakhot of misuse even though the priest sprinkled its blood, and if so this baraita supports Rav Giddel’s opinion? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita, as it is possible that it is referring to a case where the priest did not yet sprinkle the blood.

אֲבָל זָרַק, מַאי? הָכִי נָמֵי דְּאֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ? אַמַּאי קָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים – אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ?

The Gemara asks: But if that is so, what, then, is the halakha if the priest did sprinkle the blood? Is the halakha indeed that one is not liable for misusing it? If so, why is it taught in the latter clause of the baraita: Unlike an offering of the most sacred order, in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity, one who derives benefit from it is not liable for misuse of consecrated property?

לִיפְלוֹג בְּרֵישָׁא, וְלִיתְנֵי: לִפְנֵי זְרִיקָה – מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ, לְאַחַר זְרִיקָה – אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ! הָהוּא וַדַּאי מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ.

The Gemara explains the difficulty: If there is a difference between whether or not the priest sprinkled the blood, let the baraita distinguish and teach the distinction in the first clause, with regard to the case of offerings of the most sacred order itself, as follows: Before the sprinkling of the blood one is liable for misusing the offering, but after the sprinkling of the blood one is not liable for misusing it. It is not necessary to mention offerings of lesser sanctity at all. The Gemara concludes: That statement in the latter clause of the baraita certainly supports Rav Giddel’s opinion.

לֵימָא הוֹאִיל וּמְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ סֵיפָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ נָמֵי רֵישָׁא? קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים – פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ, הָכָא – לָא פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that since the latter clause supports the opinion of Rav Giddel, the first clause also supports his opinion? The Gemara again answers that even the latter clause does not necessarily support the opinion of Rav Giddel, as one can explain that the reason the baraita distinguishes between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, rather than providing a distinction within the category of offerings of the most sacred order itself, is that the case of offerings of lesser sanctity is clear-cut, i.e., all cases of offerings of lesser sanctity that are piggul are not subject to the halakhot of misuse. By contrast, here in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, it is not clear-cut, as there is a difference depending on the sprinkling of the blood.

כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: כֹּל שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים – אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ, וְכֹל שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים – מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehoshua said a principle with regard to misuse of disqualified sacrificial animals: With regard to any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests before it was disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it. Misuse fundamentally applies to items consecrated to God, which are not permitted for human consumption at all. Once the offering was permitted for consumption by the priests, it is no longer in that category. And with regard to any sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests before it was disqualified, one is liable for misusing it, as it remained consecrated to God throughout.

אֵיזוֹהִי שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים? שֶׁלָּנָה, וְשֶׁנִּטְמֵאת, וְשֶׁיָּצָאת.

The mishna clarifies: Which is the sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness for the priests? This category includes a sacrificial animal whose meat remained overnight after it was properly sacrificed, and was therefore disqualified as notar, and one that was disqualified when it became ritually impure after it was properly sacrificed, and one that left the Temple courtyard after it was properly sacrificed and was thereby disqualified. All of these disqualifications transpired after consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted, and therefore one who derives benefit from these offerings is not liable for misuse.

וְאֵיזוֹהִי שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר לַכֹּהֲנִים? שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ, וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, וְשֶׁקִּבְּלוּ פְּסוּלִין וְזָרְקוּ אֶת דָּמָהּ.

And which is the sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests? It is a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood or sacrifice its sacrificial portions beyond its designated time, or outside its designated area, or one that those unfit for Temple service collected and sprinkled its blood. All of these disqualifications occurred before consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted by means of the sprinkling of the blood. Therefore, these offerings remain consecrated to God and one is liable for misuse if one derives benefit from them.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ בַּר קַפָּרָא לְבַר פְּדָת: בֶּן אֲחוֹתִי, רְאֵה מָה אַתָּה שׁוֹאֲלֵנִי לְמָחָר בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ: הֶיתֵּר שְׁחִיטָה שָׁנִינוּ,

With regard to this matter, the Gemara relates that bar Kappara said to bar Pedat: My sister’s son, look into the topic of the question that you will ask me tomorrow in the study hall. The question involved the interpretation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement: Any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests. Was it fitness of slaughtering that we learned, i.e., provided that it was slaughtered properly, even if the offering was later disqualified, it is no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse.