Bejorot 10

אִי הָכִי, בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב מַאי אִירְיָא דְּהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר? תִּיפּוֹק לִי דְּאוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים הוּא!

The Gemara asks: If so, if this is indeed Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, why, then, does he specifically state that meat cooked in milk is susceptible to impurity because it had a period of susceptibility to contracting impurity before they were cooked together? Derive this halakha from the fact that it is food that you can feed to others, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that deriving benefit from meat and milk cooked together is not prohibited.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי עַם קָדוֹשׁ אַתָּה לַה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ״, וּלְהַלָּן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְאַנְשֵׁי קֹדֶשׁ תִּהְיוּן לִי״, מָה לְהַלָּן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה, אַף כָּאן אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה וּמוּתָּר בַּהֲנָאָה!

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: With regard to meat cooked in milk, eating it is forbidden and deriving benefit from it is permitted, as it is stated: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God; you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). And elsewhere the verse states: “And you shall be holy men to Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by animals in the field” (Exodus 22:30). Just as there, with regard to an animal torn by animals, which is forbidden as a tereifa, i.e., an animal possessing a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months, eating it is forbidden but deriving benefit from it is permitted, so too here, with regard to meat cooked in milk, where the verse mentions being holy just as the other verse did, eating it is forbidden but deriving benefit from it is permitted.

חֲדָא וְעוֹד קָאָמַר: חֲדָא — דְּאוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה יָכוֹל לְהַאֲכִילוֹ לַאֲחֵרִים הוּא, וְעוֹד — לְדִידֵיהּ נָמֵי הֲרֵי הָיְתָה לוֹ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר.

The Gemara answers: The baraita that cites Rabbi Shimon’s opinion states one reason why meat cooked in milk is susceptible to impurity and adds another. One reason is because it is food that you can feed to others. Therefore, it is called food for the purpose of being susceptible to impurity. And another reason is because even for him, i.e., a Jew, although eating the milk and meat is currently prohibited, it had a time when it was fit for consumption, i.e., before they were cooked together, and therefore they remain susceptible to impurity.

וְאִם אִיתָא דִּלְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה שָׁרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לִיתְנֵי: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר וּבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁמִּטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין!

The opinion of Rabbi Shimon that all items from which deriving benefit is prohibited are not susceptible to the impurity of food except for meat cooked in milk has been elucidated. Rava now proceeds to explain his proof that even according to Rabbi Shimon, deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey after the breaking of its neck is forbidden: And if it is so, that after breaking the neck of the firstborn donkey Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted for one to derive benefit from it, let the tanna teach: And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to a firstborn donkey and meat cooked in milk, that they are susceptible to the impurity of food. Since a firstborn donkey is not listed as an exception, Rabbi Shimon must hold that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it after its neck is broken, and it is therefore not susceptible to impurity.

אִי דְּחַשֵּׁיב עֲלֵיהּ — הָכִי נָמֵי; הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — דְּלָא חַשֵּׁיב עֲלֵיהּ.

The Gemara responds: If it is a case where the one who broke the neck of the donkey intended at the time that people would eat from it, so too it would be susceptible to the impurity of food according to Rabbi Shimon, as it is permitted to derive benefit from it. Here we are dealing with a case where he did not intend for it to be eaten, as even gentiles do not usually consume the meat of a donkey, and it therefore is not considered food.

וְטַעְמָא מַאי מְטַמְּאִי רַבָּנַן? אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הוֹאִיל וְאִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ.

The Gemara asks: But if he did not intend for anyone to eat it, what is the reason the Rabbis deem the flesh susceptible to the impurity of food? The Sages said before Rav Sheshet: It is susceptible to the impurity of food because the prohibition to eat it serves as intent to treat it as food, i.e., the very fact that it is forbidden renders it significant enough to be deemed a food.

וּלְרַבָּנַן מִי אָמַר הוֹאִיל וְאִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ? וְהָא תְּנַן: שְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר דְּבָרִים אָמְרוּ בְּנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר, וְזוֹ אַחַת מֵהֶן — צְרִיכָה מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר.

The Gemara asks: But according to the Rabbis, did they actually say that an item is susceptible to the impurity of food since its prohibition serves as its intent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Teharot 1:1) that the Sages stated thirteen matters concerning the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: It requires explicit intent that it will be eaten in order to become susceptible to the impurity of food, as most gentiles are unaccustomed to eating it, but it does not require contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity.

וְאִי אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, לְמָה לִּי מַחְשָׁבָה? הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.

And if the logic of: Its prohibition serves as its intent, is accepted, why do I need the intent here, as an unslaughtered carcass is forbidden to be eaten? The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who does not hold that its prohibition serves as its intent.

תָּא שְׁמַע: נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, וְנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר וְהַחֵלֶב בַּכְּפָרִים — צְרִיכִים מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָם צְרִיכִים הֶכְשֵׁר. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, לְמָה לִּי מַחְשָׁבָה? הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from another mishna (Okatzin 3:3): A carcass of a non-kosher animal, such as a horse or donkey, found in any location; or an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird or the fat of a kosher animal found in the villages, where the local gentiles are unaccustomed to eating it, all require intent to consume it in order to become susceptible to the impurity of food, but they do not require being rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with liquid. And if you say its prohibition serves as its intent, why do I need intent? All these foods are forbidden for consumption by a Jew. The Gemara responds: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

תָּא שְׁמַע: נִבְלַת בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, וְנִבְלַת עוֹף הַטָּהוֹר וְהַחֵלֶב בַּשְּׁוָוקִים — אֵינָן צְרִיכִין מַחְשָׁבָה וְלֹא הֶכְשֵׁר. הָא טְמֵאָה בָּעֲיָא מַחְשָׁבָה.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the same mishna: An unslaughtered carcass of a kosher animal found in any location, or the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird found in any location, or the fat of a kosher animal found in the marketplaces, i.e., in a large city that has marketplaces, where some people do eat it, do not require intent for consumption in order to be regarded as subject to impurity, as they are presumed to be food for gentiles; nor do they require contact with liquid in order for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity. The Gemara infers that only the carcass of a kosher animal does not require intent, but the carcass of a non-kosher animal requires intent. If its prohibition serves as its intent, why does it require intent for consumption?

וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָא מַנִּי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא — הָא מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אַף הַגָּמָל וְהָאַרְנֶבֶת וְהַשָּׁפָן וְהַחֲזִיר אֵינָן צְרִיכִין לֹא מַחְשָׁבָה וְלֹא הֶכְשֵׁר. וְאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ בָּהֶן סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה.

And if you would say: In accordance with whose opinion is this, it is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; one could respond that since the latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon it follows that the former clause, which is written without attribution, is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As the latter clause teaches: Rabbi Shimon says even the meat of the camel, and the hare, and the rock badger, and the pig do not require intent or contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason? The reason is that they have some characteristics of kosher animals (see Leviticus 11:4–7). If so, the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis cannot be based on whether the prohibition of the animal serves as its intent.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא אָמְרִינַן אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ, וְאִי דְּעַרְפֵיהּ מִיעְרָף — הָכִי נָמֵי,

Rather, Rava says: Everyone, including the Rabbis, agrees that we do not say its prohibition serves as its intent. And with regard to a firstborn donkey, if one broke its neck, so too, the Rabbis hold that it is not susceptible to the impurity of food, since the one who broke its neck did not intend for it to be eaten.

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְהִתְלַמֵּד בּוֹ, וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא דְּנִימוֹס וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

The Gemara answers: Here, we are dealing with a case where he slaughtered the firstborn donkey in order to teach himself how to properly slaughter an animal, and not in order to eat it. In this case, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree whether the prohibition against a Jew’s consuming it serves as intent that it be treated as food. And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Nimos and Rabbi Eliezer.

דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: סָח לִי נִימוֹס, אָחִיו שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הַגַּרְסִי, שֶׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הָעוֹרֵב לְהִתְלַמֵּד בּוֹ — דָּמוֹ מַכְשִׁיר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: דַּם שְׁחִיטָה לְעוֹלָם מַכְשִׁיר.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: Nimos, the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua HaGarsi, once related to me that in the case of one who slaughters a crow in order to teach himself how to slaughter a bird properly, its blood renders other foods susceptible to impurity, as blood is one of the seven liquids that is capable of rendering foods susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood that comes from the slaughter of an animal always renders food susceptible to impurity.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא! אֶלָּא לָאו אִיסּוּרוֹ חִישּׁוּבוֹ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t this statement of Rabbi Eliezer identical to the statement of the first tanna, i.e., Nimos? Both hold that the blood of slaughter renders food susceptible to impurity. Rather, isn’t the difference between them with regard to whether concerning the crow its prohibition serves as its intent that it should be used as food?

תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: דָּמוֹ מַכְשִׁיר לְעָלְמָא, אֲבָל לְגוּפֵיהּ בָּעֵי מַחְשָׁבָה.

Accordingly, the first tanna holds that the prohibition against consuming a crow does not render it a food. Therefore, its blood renders foods in general susceptible to impurity, but to render the crow itself a food, intent to eat it is also required, as people do not generally consume the meat of crows.

וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמֵימַר: דַּם שְׁחִיטָה לְעוֹלָם מַכְשִׁיר, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְגוּפֵיהּ נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵי מַחְשָׁבָה.

And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that the blood of slaughter always renders other foods susceptible to impurity, and even with regard to the crow itself, intent to consume it is not required, as he holds that its prohibition serves as intent to consume it. Likewise, Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a firstborn donkey in a case where it is slaughtered only in order to teach oneself how to slaughter properly. According to Rabbi Shimon, intent to eat it is required in order to render it susceptible to the impurity of food, while according to the Rabbis the prohibition to eat it in this case serves as intent for it to be used as food.

מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם — דְּשָׁאנֵי עוֹרֵב, הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה.

The Gemara responds: From where is it inferred that the dispute between Nimos and Rabbi Eliezer is with regard to this issue? Perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer there is that a crow is different, since it has some indicators of a kosher bird, and is therefore considered food. By contrast, with regard to a donkey, which has no indicators of a kosher animal, slaughtering it in order to learn how to slaughter properly does not render it food.

וּמְנָלַן דְּסִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה מִילְּתָא הִיא? דְּקָתָנֵי עֲלַהּ דְּהַהִיא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה.

The Gemara presents support for this explanation: And from where do we derive that indicators of a kosher animal are considered a significant matter concerning the impurity of food? As a baraita teaches with regard to the mishna cited on 10a that Rabbi Shimon says: What is the reason that the meat of the camel, hare, rock-badger, and pig are automatically susceptible to impurity of food without any other conditions? It is because they have some indicators of kosher animals.

וְכִי תֵּימָא: אִי מִשּׁוּם סִימָנֵי טׇהֳרָה, מַאי אִירְיָא לְהִתְלַמֵּד? אֲפִילּוּ לְהִתְעַסֵּק נָמֵי! אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, וּמִשּׁוּם נִימוֹס.

And if you would say that if the meat of the crow is susceptible to the impurity of food because of its kosher indicators, why do Rabbi Eliezer and Nimos specifically disagree in the case where it was slaughtered in order to teach oneself how to slaughter properly? Even if the one who slaughtered it acted unawares, Rabbi Eliezer should hold that its flesh should be suceptible to impurity. The response would be that yes, this is indeed so according to Rabbi Eliezer, and they disagreed in this case only because of the opinion of Nimos, who holds that even where one slaughtered the crow intentionally, if he slaughtered it in order to teach himself how to slaughter properly the crow is not susceptible to impurity.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: לֹא רָצָה לִפְדּוֹתוֹ — עוֹרְפוֹ בְּקוֹפִיץ מֵאֲחוֹרָיו וְקוֹבְרוֹ, וְאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר!

§ The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to the opinion of Rabba, who holds that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck: If one does not want to redeem his firstborn donkey with a lamb, he breaks the donkey’s neck from behind with a cleaver and buries the donkey, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted for one to derive benefit from the donkey.

אֵימָא: וּמֵחַיִּים אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר.

The Gemara responds: Say the baraita means: And while the donkey is still alive it is prohibited to derive benefit from it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted. Perhaps Rabbi Shimon agrees that following the breaking of its neck, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

וְהָא מִדְּסֵיפָא מֵחַיִּים הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא לָאו מֵחַיִּים.

The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to the prohibition to derive benefit while the donkey is alive it is apparent that the first clause, due to which this objection was raised, is not referring to deriving benefit while it is still alive.

דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: לֹא יְמִיתֶנּוּ, לֹא בְּקָנֶה וְלֹא בְּמַגָּל וְלֹא בְּקַרְדּוֹם וְלֹא בִּמְגֵירָה, וְלֹא יַכְנִיסֶנּוּ לַחֶדֶר וְיִנְעוֹל דֶּלֶת לְפָנָיו בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיָּמוּת, וְאָסוּר בְּגִיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַתִּיר!

As the latter clause teaches: One may not kill the firstborn donkey with a reed, nor with a sickle, nor with an ax, nor with a saw; nor may one put it in a room and close the door so that it will die from starvation. These are not the manners of killing the animal mandated by the Torah, which requires one to break its neck. And shearing the donkey or using it for labor is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted to shear it and to perform labor with it. Since the latter clause mentions the prohibition against shearing and working the animal, which applies only when the animal is still alive, the first clause must be referring to a case where the animal was already dead.

רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא מֵחַיִּים, רֵישָׁא — בַּהֲנָאַת דָּמָיו, סֵיפָא — בַּהֲנָאַת גּוּפוֹ.

The Gemara responds: The first clause and the latter clause are both referring to a case where the animal is alive, but the first clause is referring to the prohibition against deriving benefit from its value by renting or selling it, while the latter clause is referring to deriving benefit from the animal itself by shearing it or performing labor with it.

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי תְּנָא הֲנָאַת דָּמָיו — בְּהָהוּא קָא שָׁרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אֲבָל בַּהֲנָאַת גּוּפוֹ אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְאִי תְּנָא בַּהֲנָאַת גּוּפוֹ — בְּהָהִיא קָאָסַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אֲבָל בַּהֲנָאַת דָּמָיו אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. צְרִיכָא.

And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in both cases, as had the tanna taught only the case of deriving benefit from its value one would think that in that case Rabbi Shimon deems deriving benefit permitted; but in the case of deriving benefit from the donkey itself, say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that it is forbidden. And had the tanna taught only the case of deriving benefit from the animal itself one would think that in that case Rabbi Yehuda deems deriving benefit forbidden; but in the case of deriving benefit from its value, say that he concedes to Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the dispute in both instances.

וְכֵן אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר.

The Gemara cites an additional amora who agrees with Rabba: And similarly, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that after breaking the donkey’s neck it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וַעֲרַפְתּוֹ״, נֶאֱמַר כָּאן עֲרִיפָה, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן עֲרִיפָה, מָה לְהַלָּן אָסוּר — אַף כָּאן אָסוּר.

And Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say it? As it is taught in a baraita that the Torah states: “And if you do not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). The expression of breaking the neck is stated here, and the expression of breaking the neck is stated there with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken (see Deuteronomy 21:4). Just as there, in the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it following the ceremony, so too here, it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck.

מַנִּי? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — מֵחַיִּים מֵיסָר אָסַר! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא?

The Gemara clarifies: Who is the tanna cited in this baraita? If we say that it is Rabbi Yehuda, that is difficult, as he holds that it is already prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey while it is still alive. Why, then, would the verse need to forbid it again following the breaking of its neck? Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, indicating that he concedes that deriving benefit from the donkey is prohibited following the breaking of its neck?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: סָפְרָא חַבְרָיךְ תַּרְגּוּמַהּ: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: עֲרִיפָה בִּמְקוֹם פְּדִיָּיה עוֹמֶדֶת, מָה פְּדִיָּיה מַתֶּרֶת — אַף עֲרִיפָה מַתֶּרֶת, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

Rav Sheshet said to Rav Naḥman: Safra, your colleague, interpreted it as follows: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda is the tanna cited, and it was necessary for the verse to prohibit deriving benefit after the donkey’s death as well, as it might enter your mind to say that breaking the neck stands in place of redeeming the donkey, as it is stated: “And if you do not redeem it, then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). Therefore, it could be claimed that just as redemption permits one to derive benefit from the firstborn donkey, so too, breaking the neck permits one to derive benefit from it. Therefore, the verse teaches us that breaking the neck does not permit one to derive benefit from it.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? מִדְּתָנֵי לֵוִי: הוּא הִפְסִיד מָמוֹנוֹ שֶׁל כֹּהֵן, לְפִיכָךְ יוּפְסַד מָמוֹנוֹ.

Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that Rabbi Shimon holds it is prohibited to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey following the breaking of its neck? I say it from that which Levi teaches in a baraita with regard to the reason the Torah commands that the donkey’s neck be broken: He, the owner, caused a loss of the money of a priest by not giving him a lamb in exchange for the donkey. Therefore, his money shall also be lost.

מַנִּי? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — הָא מַיפְסַד וְקָאֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא?

The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion is followed in this baraita? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, the donkey’s monetary value is already lost, as it was already prohibited to derive benefit from it while it was alive. Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? This indicates that breaking the neck of the donkey renders deriving benefit from it prohibited.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

The Gemara responds: If you wish, say the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and if you wish, say instead that it follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, even if he holds that it is permitted to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey after its neck is broken.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, אַפְּסֵידָא דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי.

The Gemara explains: If you wish, say the baraita follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and it is referring to the loss of the difference between the value of the donkey while it is alive and the value of the lamb given as redemption to the priest, which is less than that of the donkey. This value, which the owner would have gained had he redeemed the donkey, is lost once the donkey is not redeemed.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, לִפְחַת מִיתָה.

And if you wish, say instead that it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and although he permits deriving benefit from the donkey after the breaking of its neck, there is nevertheless a depreciation of value caused by the death of the animal, as a dead donkey is worth less than a live one.

וְכֵן אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאִי תֵּימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֲמַר: עֲדַיִין הִיא מַחְלוֹקֶת.

The Gemara comments: And Reish Lakish similarly says that Rabbi Shimon concedes that deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey after the breaking of its neck is prohibited, in accordance with the statements of Rabba and Rav Naḥman. But Rabbi Yoḥanan, and some say Rabbi Elazar, says: The matter is still subject to dispute, i.e., Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda even after the death of the firstborn donkey, and permits deriving benefit from it even then.

אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ לְהָא דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אַהָא: ״הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּפֶטֶר חֲמוֹר אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת״. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

There are those who teach that which Rav Naḥman said concerning the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to this, i.e., the mishna in Kiddushin (56b): In the case of one who betroths a woman with a firstborn donkey, the woman is not betrothed, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from the donkey. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as he holds that one is permitted to derive benefit from a firstborn donkey. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: It is referring to a case of betrothal after the breaking of the donkey’s neck, and all agree, even Rabbi Shimon, that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it at that stage.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: הָא מַנִּי? לָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְלָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. אִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — תִּיקְדַּשׁ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ, אִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה — תִּיקְדַּשׁ בְּהָךְ דְּבֵינֵי בֵּינֵי!

There are those who say that the discussion with regard to the mishna proceeded as follows: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Ostensibly, it is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor that of Rabbi Shimon. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits deriving benefit from a firstborn donkey, the woman should be betrothed with the entire value. If it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, she should be betrothed with that difference between the value of the donkey after being redeemed, which remains hers, and the value of the lamb that must be given to the priest in exchange for the donkey.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל, וְסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה. דְּתַנְיָא: ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — תִּפְדֶּה מִיָּד, תִּפְדֶּה כׇּל שֶׁהוּא. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין פְּדִיָּיה פְּחוּתָה מִשֶּׁקֶל.

Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: Actually, it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and is referring to a case where the firstborn donkey is worth only a shekel, the same value as a lamb suitable for redemption, in which case there is no difference between the value of the donkey and that of the lamb. And Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda that one may not redeem a firstborn donkey with a lamb that is less than the value of a shekel, as it is taught in a baraita: When the Torah states: “You shall redeem,” with regard to a firstborn donkey, it teaches that you shall redeem it immediately, and you shall redeem it for any amount. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption for less than a shekel.

אָמַר מָר: ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — תִּפְדֶּה מִיָּד, תִּפְדֶּה כׇּל שֶׁהוּא. פְּשִׁיטָא!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said that the verse: “You shall redeem,” teaches that you shall redeem it immediately, and you shall redeem it for any amount. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Why is it necessary to derive these halakhot from the verse?

אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאִיתַּקַּשׁ לִבְכוֹר אָדָם, מָה בְּכוֹר אָדָם אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים וְחָמֵשׁ, הַאי נָמֵי אַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים וְחָמֵשׁ.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since the mitzva of redeeming a firstborn donkey is juxtaposed with that of redeeming a woman’s firstborn son in the verse: “Yet you shall redeem the firstborn of man, and the firstborn of non-kosher animals you shall redeem” (Numbers 18:15), it should be inferred that just as a woman’s firstborn son is redeemed after the baby is thirty days old and involves giving the monetary value of five sela to a priest, as stated in the next verse: “And their redemption-money, from a month old you shall redeem them, it shall be, according to your valuation, five shekels of silver” (Numbers 18:16), this firstborn donkey too should be redeemed after it is thirty days old, and a lamb whose value is at least five sela should be given to the priest.

קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — מִיָּד, ״תִּפְדֶּה״ — כׇּל שֶׁהוּא.

Therefore, the baraita teaches us: “You shall redeem,” indicating that the redemption of the donkey must be done immediately after its birth, and that you shall redeem it for any amount.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין פְּדִיָּיה פְּחוּתָה מִשֶּׁקֶל. מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ: אִי מַקֵּישׁ לִבְכוֹר אָדָם — חָמֵשׁ לִיבְעֵי, וְאִי לָא מַקֵּישׁ — שֶׁקֶל מְנָא לֵיהּ?

The baraita also states that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: There is no redemption for less than a shekel. The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, this statement is difficult: If Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda holds that the verse compares a firstborn donkey to a woman’s firstborn son, he should require a lamb worth five sela, and if the verse does not compare them, from where does Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda derive that a lamb worth a shekel is necessary?

לְעוֹלָם לָא מַקֵּישׁ, אָמַר רָבָא: אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכׇל עֶרְכְּךָ יִהְיֶה בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ״, כׇּל עֲרָכִין שֶׁאַתָּה מַעֲרִיךְ לֹא יְהוּ פְּחוּתִין מִשֶּׁקֶל.

The Gemara answers: Actually, the verse does not compare them, and the reason a lamb worth a shekel is required is due to that which Rava says: The verse states with regard to redemption of consecrated property: “And all your valuations shall be with the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25), which indicates that all valuations that you assess should not be less than the value of a shekel.

וְרַבָּנַן: הַהוּא

And the Rabbis who disagree with him hold that that verse