Keretot 24

בְּמַפְרִישׁ שְׁנֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת לְאַחְרָיוּת וְנִתְכַּפֵּר בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן, דְּשֵׁנִי יִרְעֶה עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֵב וְיִמָּכֵר וְיִפְּלוּ דָּמָיו לִנְדָבָה.

in a case where one designates two provisional guilt offerings from the outset as a guarantee, so that if one is lost he may achieve atonement with the other, and he achieved atonement with one of them. He concedes that the second animal retains its sanctity and shall graze until it becomes blemished and that then it shall be sold and the money received for it shall be allocated for communal gift offerings.

מַאי טַעְמָא? עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי רַבִּי מֵאִיר עֲלֵיהוֹן דְּרַבָּנַן אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא גַּלִּי דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּלִבּוֹ נוֹקְפוֹ, אֲבָל הָכָא, מִכְּדִי חַד הוּא דְּאִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְאַפְרוֹשֵׁי, מַאי טַעְמָא אַפְרֵישׁ תְּרֵי? דְּסָבַר: אִי מִירְכַס חֲדָא מִיכַּפַּרְנָא בְּאִידַּךְ חַבְרֵיהּ, וְכֵיוָן דְּגַלִּי דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּלִבּוֹ נוֹקְפוֹ הָיָה, הוֹאִיל וְכָךְ הָיָה גָּמַר וְהִקְדִּישׁוֹ.

What is the reason that Rabbi Meir agrees in such a case? Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Rabbis in a case where one brings a provisional guilt offering and later discovers with certainty that he did not sin, only because Rabbi Meir holds that the one consecrating the animal did not initially reveal that his heart was striking him with pangs of conscience. But here, in a case where he set aside two animals as provisional guilt offerings, since he was required to designate only one animal, what is the reason that he designated two? Evidently, the reason is that he thought: If one of the animals is lost, I will achieve atonement with the other one. And as he revealed by this scrupulous behavior that his heart was striking him with pangs of conscience, since that was so, he wholeheartedly resolved to consecrate the animal.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עֵדָיו, דְּיֵצֵא וְיִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir in a case of a provisional guilt offering where two witnesses testified that someone may have committed a sin, e.g., that he ate a piece of fat with regard to which there was uncertainty if it was permitted or forbidden fat, and later those witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses, that the animal shall go out and graze among the flock as a non-sacred animal.

מַאי טַעְמָא? עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ אֶלָּא הֵיכָא דְּאַפְרְשֵׁיהּ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ, וְאָמְרִינַן לִבּוֹ נוֹקְפוֹ, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּעַל פִּי עֵדִים אַפְרְשֵׁיהּ – לָא הֲוָה סָמֵיךְ עִילָּוֵי עֵדִים, דְּסָבַר: דִּלְמָא אָתוּ אֲחֵרִים וּמַזְּמִי לְהוּ.

What is the reason? It is that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir only in a case where the person designated the animal as a provisional guilt offering of his own volition, and therefore we say that his heart was striking him with pangs of conscience and he wholeheartedly resolved to consecrate the animal. But in a case where he designated the animal as a provisional guilt offering due to the testimony of witnesses, he was not relying on the witnesses. Rather, he thought: Perhaps other witnesses will come and render these witnesses conspiring witnesses.

מֵתִיב רָבָא: שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל אֵינוֹ כֵּן, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִסְקַל – יֵצֵא וְיִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאָתוּ בֵּי תְרֵי אָמְרִי ״הָרַג״, וּבֵי תְרֵי אָמְרִי ״לֹא הָרַג״ – מַאי חָזֵית דְּצָיְיתַ[תְּ] לְבָתְרָאֵי? צִיית לְהוּ לְקַמָּאֵי!

Rava raises an objection from the mishna: The case of an ox that is sentenced to be stoned is not similar to the case of a provisional guilt offering, as even the Rabbis agree that if it is discovered that the testimony with regard to the ox was false before it was stoned, it shall go out and graze among the flock. Rava explains his objection: What are the circumstances? If we say that initially two people came and said that the ox killed someone and the animal was therefore sentenced to be stoned, and two people later say that the ox did not kill, what did you see that you listen to the latter pair? You could just as well listen to the former pair.

אֶלָּא לָאו בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה. וְדִכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי אָשָׁם תָּלוּי – בְּעֵדֵי הֲזָמָה, וּפְלִיגִי!

Rather, isn’t the mishna referring to conspiring witnesses, i.e., the second pair of witnesses testified that the first pair were not in the vicinity at the time of the incident and therefore the testimony of the second pair of witnesses is accepted? And if so, in the corresponding situation in the mishna with regard to a provisional guilt offering, it is likewise referring to conspiring witnesses, i.e., one designated an animal as a provisional guilt offering due to the testimony of witnesses, and they were subsequently proven to be conspiring witnesses. And yet the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir in that case and rule that this provisional guilt offering is not rendered non-sacred.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְדִלְמָא שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל הֵיכִי דָמֵי – כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּא הָרוּג בְּרַגְלָיו.

Abaye said to Rava: This proof is inconclusive. Perhaps one can say that in the case of an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, which goes out and grazes among the flock, what are the circumstances? It is not referring to conspiring witnesses, but rather to a case where the supposedly killed individual comes to the court on his feet, thereby conclusively disproving the testimony.

וְדִכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי אָשָׁם תָּלוּי – כְּגוֹן דְּהוּכְּרָה חֲתִיכָה. אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּאַפְרְשֵׁיהּ לְאָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל פִּי עֵדִים – לָא.

And in the corresponding situation in the mishna of a provisional guilt offering, it is referring to a case where one designated the animal as a provisional guilt offering of his own volition, and, for example, it later became known that the uncertain piece of fat that he ate was permitted fat. But in a case where he designated an animal as a provisional guilt offering due to the testimony of witnesses, he did not wholeheartedly resolve to consecrate the animal, and therefore it shall go out and graze among the flock.

בִּפְלוּגְתָּא: אָשָׁם תָּלוּי שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עֵדָיו – רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הִיא כְּמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת, דְּתַנְיָא: נִמְצְאוּ עֵדֶיהָ זוֹמְמִין – מִנְחָתָהּ תֵּצֵא לְחוּלִּין.

The Gemara notes that Rav Yehuda and Rava, who discuss the case of conspiring witness above, disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one designated an animal as a provisional guilt offering due to the testimony of witnesses and then those witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses, Rabbi Elazar says: This case is similar to a meal offering of jealousy, sacrificed as part of the trial undergone by a sota, i.e., a suspected adulteress (see Numbers 5:25–26). As it is taught in a baraita: If the witnesses who testified about her were later found to be conspiring, her meal offering is transferred to non-sacred status. Likewise, a provisional guilt offering whose witnesses were proven to be conspiring witnesses becomes non-sacred.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: יִרְעֶה עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֵב וְיִמָּכֵר וְיִפְּלוּ דָּמָיו לִנְדָבָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, נְדַמְּיֵיהּ לְמִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת! לָא דָּמֵי, מִנְחַת קְנָאוֹת לָא לְכַפָּרָה קָאָתְיָיא, אֶלָּא לְבָרֵר עָוֹן. אֲבָל אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, דִּלְכַפָּרָה אָתֵי, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלִּבּוֹ נוֹקְפוֹ גּוֹמֵר וּמַקְדִּישׁוֹ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: That provisional guilt offering shall graze until it becomes blemished; and then it shall be sold, and the money received for it shall be allocated for communal gift offerings. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, let us compare that case to a meal offering of jealousy, as claimed by Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yoḥanan would claim that the cases are not similar: A meal offering of jealousy does not come for atonement, but rather to clarify the sin of the sota. Since it has been clarified that she did not sin, the meal offering becomes non-sacred. But with regard to a provisional guilt offering, which comes for atonement, one must explain as follows: Since his heart strikes him with pangs of conscience, he wholeheartedly resolves to consecrate the animal, and therefore it remains sacred.

אָמַר רַבִּי כְּרוּסְפָּדַאי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עֵדָיו – כׇּל הַמַּחֲזִיק בּוֹ זָכָה בּוֹ.

§ Rabbi Keruspedai says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to an ox that is stoned whose witnesses were rendered conspiring,anyone who takes possession of the ox acquires it, as the owner of the ox relinquished his possession upon hearing that the animal is sentenced to die.

אָמַר רָבָא: מִסְתַּבְּרָא טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, כְּגוֹן דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: נִרְבַּע שׁוֹרוֹ. אֲבָל אָמְרוּ: רָבַע שׁוֹרוֹ, הוּא בְּעַצְמוֹ מִידָּע יָדַיע דְּלָא רְבַע וְלָא מַפְקַר לֵיהּ, וְטָרַח וּמַיְיתֵי עֵדִים.

Rava said: The explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan stands to reason in a case where the witnesses said to him that his ox was the object of bestiality; since he assumes that the witnesses are telling the truth, he relinquishes his ownership of the animal. But if the witnesses said that the owner himself engaged in bestiality with his ox, he knows about himself that he did not engage in bestiality with the ox, and therefore he will not relinquish his ownership of the ox. But rather, he will make an effort and bring other witnesses to prove that those witnesses are conspiring.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אִיתַּי אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עֵדֶיהָ – כׇּל הַמַּחֲזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ?

The Gemara asks: And what is different between this case and that which Rava bar Ittai says that Reish Lakish says: In a case of an idolatrous city, where witnesses testified that the majority of inhabitants committed idolatry, and the halakha is that all of the city’s property must be burned, if its witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses, anyone who takes possession of the city’s property acquires it? In this case, the residents of the city know about themselves that they did not commit idolatry.

עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, דְּרַבִּים נִינְהוּ, כֹּל חַד אָמַר בְּדַעְתֵּיהּ: אֲנָא לָא חֲטַאי, אַחֲרִינָא חֲטָא, וּמַפְקַר מָמוֹנֵיהּ. אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּבְדִידֵיהּ תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא, הוּא בְּעַצְמוֹ מִידָּע יָדַע דְּלָא רְבַע, וְלָא מַפְקַר לֵיהּ, וְטָרַח וּמַיְיתֵי עֵדִים.

The Gemara responds: With regard to an idolatrous city, which involves many people, each person says to himself: Although I did not sin, others sinned, and consequently the city will be entirely burned; and he therefore relinquished ownership of his property. But here, with regard to the ox sentenced to be stoned, where the matter is dependent solely upon the owner himself, he knows about himself that he did not engage in bestiality with the ox, and therefore he does not relinquish his ownership of the ox. But rather, he will make an effort and bring other witnesses to prove that these are conspiring witnesses. Therefore, if they are in fact found to be conspiring witnesses, the ox remains in his possession.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַנּוֹתֵן מַתָּנָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ, וְאָמַר הַלָּה: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהּ״ – כׇּל הַמַּחֲזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ.

§ The Gemara cites another example of a case where anyone who takes possession acquires an item. Reish Lakish says: In the case of one who gives a gift to another and that person receiving the gift says: I do not want [ee efshi] it, anyone who takes possession of the item acquires it, as ownership of the item has been relinquished.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מְקַבֵּל מַתָּנָה שֶׁאָמַר לְאַחַר שֶׁבָּאת מַתָּנָה לְיָדוֹ: ״מַתָּנָה זוֹ תִּיבָּטֵל״, ״מְבוּטֶּלֶת״, ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהּ״ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין. ״בְּטֵילָה״, ״אֵינָהּ מַתָּנָה״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: And what is different between this case and that statement which Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav Sheshet says, and some say that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rav Sheshet says: With regard to one who receives a gift who, after the gift entered his possession, said: Let this gift become void, or said: This gift is rendered void, or said: I do not want it, his statement is effective. But if he said: It is void, or: It is not a gift, it is as though he said nothing.

מַאי לָאו ״דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין״ – דְּהָדְרָא לְמָרַהּ? לָא, דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין – וְהוּא נָמֵי לָא קָנֵי לַהּ, וְכׇל הַמַּחֲזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ.

What, is it not that when the baraita states: His statement is effective, this means that the gift returns to its previous owner? This ruling contradicts the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds that in such a case anyone who takes possession of the item acquires it. The Gemara answers: No, the phrase: His statement is effective, means that the previous owner also does not acquire the item; and as the item is not in the possession of either the giver or receiver of the gift, anyone who takes possession of it acquires it.

מֵיתִיבִי: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עַל שָׂדֶה זוֹ״, ״אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּהּ״, וְ״יָדִי מְסוּלֶּקֶת הֵימֶנָּה״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. וְהָא ״יָדִי מְסוּלֶּקֶת הֵימֶנָּה״ כְּאִי אֶפְשִׁי דָּמֵי, וְקָתָנֵי: לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם!

The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Reish Lakish from a baraita: With regard to one who says to another person with whom he shares property: I have no legal dealings or involvement with this field, or: I have no business with it, or: My hand is removed from it, he has not said anything of consequence, i.e., he does not relinquish his ownership of the property. But the phrase: My hand is removed from it, is like the phrase: I do not want it, and yet it is taught in the baraita that he has not said anything. This ruling apparently contradicts the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds that in such a case anyone who takes possession of the item acquires it.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: כִּי סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ מִדִּין וּדְבָרִים, מִגּוּפַהּ דְּשָׂדֶה לָא סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

The Gemara responds: That case in the baraita there is different, as when he says that he is removing himself, he is referring to removal from legal dealings or involvement. He is not removing himself from the field itself.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, וְאָמַר הַלָּה: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״, אִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי כֹּהֵן – אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כְּבָר זָכוּ בָּהֶן יוֹרְשִׁין.

The Gemara raises another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita: In the case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a document granting his property as a gift to another, and there were slaves among his property, and the other person said: I do not want them, his objection is disregarded. Consequently, if their second master, the recipient, was a priest, his slaves may partake of teruma, as they are now slaves of a priest. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once the other person said: I do not want them, the previous owner’s heirs have already acquired them.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, קָסָבַר: כִּי יָהֵיב אִינִישׁ מַתָּנָה אַדַּעְתָּא דִּמְקַבְּלִין לַהּ מִינֵּיהּ, כִּי לָא מְקַבְּלִין לַהּ מִינֵּיהּ הָדְרָא לְמָרַהּ.

Granted there is no difficulty according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as he holds that when a person gives a gift, it is with the intention that the other person will accept the gift from him. Therefore, when the other individual does not accept it from him, the gift returns to its previous owner.

אֶלָּא לְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אִי כִּי אָמַר ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כׇּל הַמַּחֲזִיק בָּהֶן זָכָה בָּהֶן, הָכָא, דְּאָמַר שֵׁנִי ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – הָווּ לְהוּ זָרִים, וְקָאָכְלִי זָרִים תְּרוּמָה! קָסָבַר: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ, וְקָסָבַר: מְעוּכָּב לְגֵט שִׁחְרוּר – אוֹכֵל בִּתְרוּמָה.

But according to the opinion of the first tanna, if Reish Lakish is correct that when one says: I do not want it, anyone who takes possession of the item acquires it, as the item becomes ownerless, then here, where the second master said: I do not want them, the slaves are non-priests, and this would mean that non-priests are partaking of teruma. The Gemara answers: The first tanna holds that with regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his master. And he further holds that a slave detained in his master’s possession only due to not having received a bill of manumission may partake of teruma if he is the slave of a priest.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יִקְרַב כּוּ׳. לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, לְמָה לִי חֵטְא? הָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בִּנְדָבָה אָתֵי, דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם!

§ The mishna teaches: In the case of one who brings a provisional guilt offering and it became known to him that he did not sin, if he made that discovery before the ram was slaughtered, Rabbi Eliezer says: It shall be sacrificed as a provisional guilt offering, as if it does not come to atone for that sin that he thought, it comes to atone for another sin. The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, why do I need another sin? Doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer say that a provisional guilt offering may come as a gift offering? As we learned in a mishna (25a) that Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּאָמְרוּ לוֹ הוּא, דִּתְנַן: אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: הַמְתֵּן עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לְבֵית הַסָּפֵק.

Rav Ashi said: The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that is taught in the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta in the mishna below, as we learned in the continuation of that mishna (25a): Rabbi Eliezer said that Bava ben Buta would bring a provisional guilt offering every day, and he wanted to bring one even immediately after Yom Kippur. But they said to him: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty, so that the provisional guilt offering is brought for some sort of uncertain sin, and do not sacrifice it purely as a gift offering.

אִם מִשֶּׁנִּשְׁחַט נוֹדַע כּוּ׳. קָתָנֵי: הַבָּשָׂר יֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵפָה. אַלְמָא: חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה – בִּשְׂרֵיפָה.

§ With regard to one who brought a provisional guilt offering and after the ram was slaughtered it became known to him that he did not sin, the mishna teaches: The flesh shall go out to the place of burning. Evidently, according to the opinion of the tanna of the mishna, non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, such as this provisional guilt offering that was mistakenly consecrated, are to be burned.

וּרְמִינְהִי: אָשָׁם וַדַּאי אֵינוֹ כֵּן, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁחַט – יֵצֵא וְיִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר, מִשֶּׁנִּשְׁחַט – הֲרֵי זֶה יִקָּבֵר! אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תִּבְרַאּ, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ.

But one may raise a contradiction from a ruling later in the mishna: In the case of a definite guilt offering, that is not so; if he made that discovery before the ram was slaughtered, it shall go out and graze among the flock. If it became known to him after the ram was slaughtered that he did not sin, it shall be buried. This indicates that non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are buried. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, i.e., it cites the opinions of two different Sages. He who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha.

אָמַר רַבָּה: אָשָׁם וַדַּאי עַל אָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָרָמֵית? אָשָׁם וַדַּאי, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא צְרִיךְ לֵיהּ – לָא מַקְדֵּישׁ לֵיהּ. אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלִּבּוֹ נוֹקְפוֹ – גּוֹמֵר וּמַקְדִּשׁוֹ.

Rabba said: Are you raising a contradiction from the halakha of a definite guilt offering with regard to the halakha of a provisional guilt offering? In the case of a definite guilt offering, he consecrated it under the assumption that he was obligated to sacrifice it. Since it later became clear to him that he does not need to sacrifice the animal, it is considered as though he did not consecrate it, and the animal is non-sacred. But with regard to a provisional guilt offering, since initially his heart struck him with pangs of conscience over a sin that he might have committed, he wholeheartedly resolves to consecrate the animal. Therefore, the animal remains consecrated, and its status is that of a guilt offering disqualified for sacrifice.

אֶלָּא אִי קַשְׁיָא, אָשָׁם וַדַּאי עַל אָשָׁם וַדַּאי קַשְׁיָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: הֲרֵי זֶה יִקָּבֵר, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וְהַבָּשָׂר יֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵיפָה! הָא וַדַּאי תִּבְרַאּ, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ.

Rather, if the mishna poses a difficulty, then the apparent contradiction between this halakha of a definite guilt offering and another halakha of a definite guilt offering is difficult. As it is taught in the mishna: If after the ram was slaughtered it became known to him that he did not sin, it shall be buried. Now say the latter clause of that section of the mishna: If after the blood was sprinkled he discovered that he did not sin, the flesh shall go out to the place of burning. Accordingly, this mishna is certainly disjointed, and he who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: רֵישָׁא דְּקָתָנֵי בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי: ״וְהַבָּשָׂר יֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵיפָה״ – לָא קַשְׁיָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיתְחֲזֵי כְּזֶבַח פָּסוּל.

Rav Ashi said: The first clause, which teaches with regard to a provisional guilt offering: The flesh shall go out to the place of burning, is not difficult. Its flesh is not treated like that of a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the courtyard, which must be buried. It is burned because it has the appearance of a disqualified offering, which must be burned. This reason applies equally in the case of a definite guilt offering where it became known to him that he did not sin only after the blood was sprinkled, which is why it too must be burned. But if he discovered that he was not obligated to bring the definite guilt offering after the ram was slaughtered but before its blood was sprinkled, it shall be buried, as this does not appear like a disqualified offering, since it is no longer a definite guilt offering and its blood was not sprinkled.

נִזְרַק הַדָּם – הַבָּשָׂר יֵאָכֵל. וְאַמַּאי? הָא הַוְיָא לֵיהּ יְדִיעָה! אָמַר רָבָא, אֲמַר קְרָא: ״וְהוּא לֹא יָדַע וְנִסְלַח לוֹ״, וְהָא לָא הָוְיָא לֵיהּ יְדִיעָה בִּשְׁעַת סְלִיחָה.

The mishna teaches: With regard to one who brought a provisional guilt offering, if the blood was sprinkled and then he discovered that he did not sin and the meat is intact, the meat may be eaten by the priests. The Gemara asks: But why is the meat eaten? After all, he now has certain knowledge of his sin, and a provisional guilt offering is brought only by one who is uncertain about his sin. Rava said that the verse states: “And he knew it not, and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 5:18), and this person did not have knowledge of his sin at the time of forgiveness, i.e., when he achieved atonement, which is the moment of the sprinkling of the blood.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ הַדָּם בַּכּוֹס כּוּ׳. לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אַמַּאי יִזָּרֵק? הָא הָוְיָא לֵיהּ יְדִיעָה בִּשְׁעַת סְלִיחָה! אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִיזָּרֵק – כְּזָרוּק דָּמֵי.

§ The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the blood of the provisional guilt offering was still in the cup but had not yet been sprinkled when he discovered that he did not sin, the blood shall be sprinkled and the meat may be eaten. The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yosei, why is the blood sprinkled? This person had knowledge of his sin at the moment of forgiveness. Rava said that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The halakhic status of any blood that is received in a vessel and is ready to be sprinkled is like that of blood that has already been sprinkled.

אֵימַר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, בְּמִידֵּי דְּעוֹמֵד לִיזָּרֵק, אֲבָל הַאי, אֵין עוֹמֵד לִיזָּרֵק! אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: כְּלֵי שָׁרֵת מְקַדְּשִׁין בּוֹ אֶת הַפָּסוּל בַּתְּחִלָּה לִיקְרַב.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say that Rabbi Shimon said this principle only with regard to an item that is ready to be sprinkled with certainty, but not with regard to the blood of this provisional guilt offering, with regard to which it will be discovered before the sprinkling that he did not sin. In this case, from the outset it was not ready to be sprinkled. They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that Rabbi Yosei holds: The service vessel consecrates disqualified offerings to be sacrificed on the altar ab initio.

אָשָׁם וַדַּאי אֵינוֹ כֵּן כּוּ׳. אִיתְּמַר: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵימָתַי נֶאֱסֶרֶת? רַב הַמְנוּנָא אָמַר: מֵחַיִּים, רָבָא אָמַר: לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה.

§ The mishna teaches: In the case of a definite guilt offering, that is not so, and likewise in the case of a heifer whose neck is broken that is not so. If the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall go out and graze among the flock as a non-sacred animal. But if the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall be buried in its place. It was stated that there is a related dispute between amora’im: From when is it prohibited to derive benefit from a heifer whose neck is broken? Rav Hamnuna says: The prohibition takes effect from when the animal is still alive. Rava says: The prohibition goes into effect after the breaking of the neck of the animal.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרָבָא – מֵעִידָּנָא דְּאִיתְעֲבִיד בַּהּ מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא לְרַב הַמְנוּנָא, מֵאֵימָתַי?

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, according to Rava the prohibition takes effect from the moment that an action, i.e., breaking of the neck, was performed on the heifer. But according to Rav Hamnuna, from when exactly does the prohibition take effect?