Nedarim 88

אָמַר רָבָא: הָכָא מֵעִנְיָנֵיהּ דִּקְרָא וְהָכָא מֵעִנְיָנֵיהּ דִּקְרָא. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: גַּבֵּי רוֹצֵחַ כְּתִיב ״וַאֲשֶׁר יָבֹא אֶת רֵעֵהוּ בַיַּעַר״ — כׇּל דְּבַר מֵיעַל לְיַעַר, וְסּוֹמֵא נָמֵי בַּר מֵיעַל לְיַעַר הוּא. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ ״בְּלֹא רְאוֹת״ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַסּוֹמֵא — מִ״יַּעַר״ נָפְקָא לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: ״בְּלֹא רְאוֹת״ פְּרָט לְסּוֹמֵא.

Rava said: There is no contradiction here, as the dispute with regard to an unintentional killing is based on divergent interpretations of the verse. Here, the ruling follows from the context of the verse, and there, the ruling follows from the context of the verse. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that with regard to the exile of an unintentional killer it is written: “And a man who goes into the forest with his neighbor to hew wood” (Deuteronomy 19:5), which serves to include anyone who is capable of entering a forest, and a blind person is also capable of entering a forest. And if you say that the phrase “without seeing” serves to include a blind person, this is already derived from the word “forest,” as he too can enter a forest. Rather, learn from it that the phrase “without seeing” serves to exclude a blind person from the category of unintentional killers who are exiled to a city of refuge.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: כְּתִיב ״בִּבְלִי דַעַת״ — כׇּל דְּבַר מִידָּע, וְסּוֹמֵא לָאו בַּר מִידָּע הוּא. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ ״בְּלֹא רְאוֹת״ פְּרָט לַסּוֹמֵא — מִ״בְּלִי דַעַת״ נָפְקָא לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: ״בְּלֹא רְאוֹת״ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַסּוֹמֵא.

By contrast, Rabbi Meir maintains: It is written in that same section: “One who strikes his neighbor without knowledge” (Deuteronomy 19:4), which indicates that the halakha applies to anyone who is capable of knowing the precise location of the people standing about him, but a blind person is not capable of knowing this. And if you say that the phrase “without seeing” serves to exclude a blind person, this is already derived from the words “without knowledge.” Rather, learn from it that the phrase “without seeing” serves to include a blind person in the halakha of exile, not to exclude him.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּדִּיר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲתָנוֹ, וְהוּא רוֹצֶה לָתֵת לְבִתּוֹ מָעוֹת, אוֹמֵר לָהּ: הֲרֵי הַמָּעוֹת הָאֵלּוּ נְתוּנִין לָךְ בְּמַתָּנָה, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא לְבַעְלִיךְ רְשׁוּת בָּהֶן, אֶלָּא מָה שֶׁאַתְּ נוֹשֵׂאת וְנוֹתֶנֶת בְּפִיךְ.

MISHNA: With regard to one who vows that benefit from him is forbidden to his son-in-law, but he nevertheless wishes to give his daughter, i.e., the wife of that same son-in-law, money, then, though he cannot do so directly, as anything acquired by a woman belongs to her husband, he should say to her: This money is hereby given to you as a gift, provided that your husband has no rights to it, but the gift includes only that which you pick up and place in your mouth.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא דְּאָמַר לַהּ ״מָה שֶׁאַתְּ נוֹשֵׂאת וְנוֹתֶנֶת בְּפִיךְ״, אֲבָל אָמַר ״מַה שֶּׁתִּרְצִי עֲשִׂי״, קְנָה יָתְהוֹן בַּעַל. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״מַה שֶּׁתִּרְצִי עֲשִׂי״ — לָא קְנָה יָתְהוֹן בַּעַל. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא:

GEMARA: Rav said that they taught this halakha only in a case where he actually said to her: That which you pick up and place in your mouth is yours. But if he said: Do as you please with the money, his stipulation is of no effect, and the husband acquires the money. And Shmuel says that even if he said: Do as you please with the money, the husband does not acquire it. Rabbi Zeira objects to this statement of Rav:

כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא שְׁמַעְתָּא דְּרַב — כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: יַד אִשָּׁה כְּיַד בַּעְלָהּ.

In accordance with whose opinion among the tanna’im does Rav’s halakha correspond? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said as a principle that the hand of a woman is like the hand of her husband. According to Rabbi Meir, a slave has no independent right of acquisition, and anything given to a slave belongs to his master even if it was stipulated otherwise (see Kiddushin 23b). Rav assumes that similarly, a married woman has no independent right of acquisition, but rather, anything that she attempts to acquire for herself is automatically acquired by her husband.

וּרְמִינְהוּ: כֵּיצַד מִשְׁתַּתְּפִין בְּמָבוֹי? מַנִּיחַ אֶת הֶחָבִית וְאוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי זֶה לְכׇל בְּנֵי מָבוֹי. וּמְזַכֶּה לָהֶן עַל יְדֵי עַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הָעִבְרִים, וְעַל יְדֵי בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים, וְעַל יְדֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ.

Rabbi Zeira continues: And raise a contradiction from an unattributed mishna (Eiruvin 73b), which presumably follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir: How does one merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway in order to permit its residents to carry on Shabbat from one courtyard to another in the same alley, if a person wishes to act on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway? He places a barrel filled with his own food or wine and says: This is for all the residents of the alleyway. For this gift to be acquired by the others, someone must accept it on their behalf, and the tanna therefore teaches that he may transfer possession to them even by means of his Hebrew slave or maidservant, whom he does not own, and likewise by means of his adult son or daughter, and similarly by means of his wife. These people may acquire the eiruv food on behalf of all the residents of the alleyway.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ קְנָה יָתְהוֹן בַּעְלַהּ, עֵירוּב לָא נָפֵיק מֵרְשׁוּתֵיהּ דְּבַעַל!

Rabbi Zeira states the contradiction: And if you say that a woman’s husband acquires anything given to her, the eiruv food has consequently not left the husband’s domain when he gives it to his wife, for anything she acquires belongs to him. Rather, it can be seen from here that Rabbi Meir does not extend his principle from a slave to a married woman, in opposition of the ruling of Rav.

אָמַר רָבָא: אַף עַל גַּב דְּאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר יַד אִשָּׁה כְּיַד בַּעְלָהּ, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְעִנְיַן שִׁיתּוּף, דְּכֵיוָן דִּלְזַכּוֹת לַאֲחֵרִים הוּא מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ — זָכְיָא.

Rava said in response: Even though Rabbi Meir said that in general the hand of a woman is like the hand of her husband, in accordance with the ruling of Rav, Rabbi Meir nevertheless concedes with regard to the merging of alleyways that since it is her aim to acquire the eiruv food for others from the hand of her husband, and not to acquire it for herself, she can acquire it from him for this purpose.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אֵלּוּ שֶׁזָּכִין לָהֶן: [עַל יְדֵי] בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַגְּדוֹלִים, וְעַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הָעִבְרִים. וְאֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין זָכִין לָהֶן: עַל יְדֵי בְּנוֹ וּבִתּוֹ הַקְּטַנִּים, וְעַבְדּוֹ וְשִׁפְחָתוֹ הַכְּנַעֲנִים, וְאִשְׁתּוֹ!

Ravina raised an objection to Rav Ashi from the following baraita: These are the people who can acquire eiruv food on behalf of others: The eiruv food can be acquired by means of his adult son or daughter, and by means of his Hebrew slave or maidservant. And these are the people who cannot acquire an eiruv on behalf of others: The eiruv food cannot be acquired by means of his minor son or daughter, or by means of his Canaanite slave or maidservant, or by means of his wife. This indicates that a married woman does not have an independent right of acquisition to acquire the eiruv food on behalf of others, in opposition to the ruling of the mishna.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין בְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ חָצֵר בְּאוֹתוֹ מָבוֹי עָסְקִינַן, דְּמִגּוֹ דְּזָכְיָא לְנַפְשַׁהּ — זָכְיָא לְאַחֲרִינֵי.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: In the mishna in Eiruvin, we are dealing with a woman who possesses a courtyard of her own in that alleyway, i.e., it is a case where the husband had earlier stipulated that she should have property of her own, to which he renounces all his rights. As, since she acquires the eiruv food for herself by virtue of the courtyard that she owns in that alleyway, she likewise acquires it for others.

מַתְנִי׳ ״וְנֵדֶר אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁהּ יָקוּם עָלֶיהָ״, כֵּיצַד? אָמְרָה ״הֲרֵינִי נְזִירָה לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם — אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר.

MISHNA: The Torah states: “But every vow of a widow, and of her that is divorced, with which she has bound her soul, shall stand against her” (Numbers 30:10). How so? If a widow or divorced woman said: I am hereby a nazirite after thirty days, then even if she was married within thirty days, her new husband cannot nullify her vow.