Arachin 6

תָּנָא חֲדָא: גּוֹי שֶׁהִתְנַדֵּב נְדָבָה לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת מְקַבְּלִים הֵימֶנּוּ, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֵין מְקַבְּלִין!

§ The Gemara notes that there is an apparent contradiction with regard to the issue of whether or not a gentile may donate for the purpose of Temple maintenance. It was taught in one baraita: In the case of a gentile who pledged a gift for Temple maintenance, one accepts it from him. And it is taught in another baraita: One does not accept it from him.

אָמַר רַבִּי אִילָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא — בַּתְּחִילָּה, הָא — בַּסּוֹף.

Rabbi Ila says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is not difficult. This baraita, which teaches that the donation is not accepted, is stated with regard to the beginning of the building of the Temple. The donation is refused in order that the Jews not rely upon on the donations of gentiles. That baraita, which states that the donation is accepted, is stated with regard to the end of the building of the Temple, i.e., after it is already built.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בִּתְחִילָּה, אֲפִילּוּ מַיִם וּמֶלַח אֵין מְקַבְּלִין מֵהֶם. בַּסּוֹף, דָּבָר הַמְסוּיָּים אֵין מְקַבְּלִין, דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְסוּיָּים מְקַבְּלִין. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי דָּבָר הַמְסוּיָּים? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: כְּגוֹן אַמָּה כָּלְיָא עוֹרֵב.

As Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to donations of gentiles for Temple maintenance: With regard to the beginning of the building of the Temple, one may not accept even water and salt from them. With regard to the end of the building of the Temple, one may not accept a defined item, i.e., if it will be clear that this was donated by a gentile. But one may accept their gift of an item that is not defined. The Gemara asks: What is considered to be a defined item? Rav Yosef says: For example, the cubit-wide spiked plates placed on the roof of the Sanctuary, which were designed to eliminate the ravens.

מֵתִיב רַב יוֹסֵף: ״וְאִיגֶּרֶת אֶל אָסָף שׁוֹמֵר הַפַּרְדֵּס אֲשֶׁר לַמֶּלֶךְ וְגוֹ׳״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבַּיֵּי: שָׁאנֵי מַלְכוּתָא דְּלָא הָדְרָא בַּיהּ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אִי אָמַר מַלְכוּתָא ״עָקַרְנָא טוּרֵי״, עָקַר טוּרֵי וְלָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.

Rav Yosef raises an objection to the ruling of the baraita as interpreted by Rabbi Yoḥanan, that with regard to the beginning of the building of the Temple nothing is accepted from gentiles. Nehemiah requested from the king of Persia: “And a letter to Asaph the keeper of the king’s park, that he may give me timber to make beams for the gates of the castle that pertains to the house” (Nehemiah 2:8). Here Nehemiah clearly asked for material from gentiles. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Actions taken by the government are different, as the government does not retract its decisions. As Shmuel says: If the government says: I will uproot mountains, it will uproot mountains and not retract what it said.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: גּוֹי שֶׁהִפְרִישׁ תְּרוּמָה מִכִּרְיוֹ, בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ, אִי בְּדַעַת יִשְׂרָאֵל הִפְרִישָׁהּ — תִּינָּתֵן לַכֹּהֵן, וְאִם לָאו — טְעוּנָה גְּנִיזָה, חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא בְּלִבּוֹ לַשָּׁמַיִם.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a gentile who separated teruma from his pile of grain, one examines him to determine his intent. If he separated it with the intent that it be like the teruma of Jews, it should be given to a priest. If not, it requires interment, as we are concerned that perhaps his heart was directed toward Heaven, i.e., his intent was to consecrate it to the Temple and he did not want it to be given to a priest. Since there is uncertainty with regard to his intent, nothing can be done with that produce.

מֵיתִיבִי: גּוֹי שֶׁהִתְנַדֵּב קוֹרָה, וְשֵׁם כָּתוּב עָלֶיהָ — בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתוֹ, אִם אָמַר: ״בְּדַעַת יִשְׂרָאֵל הִפְרַשְׁתִּיהָ״ — יָגוֹד וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בַּמּוֹתָר, וְאִם לָאו — טְעוּנָה גְּנִיזָה, חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא בְּלִבּוֹ לַשָּׁמַיִם.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: In the case of a gentile who donated a cross beam and brought it to a synagogue, and the name of God is written on it, one examines him to determine his intent. If he says: I separated it with the intent that it be like the donations of Jews, the name should be cut off [yagod] and interred, and one uses the remainder for a synagogue. And if not, the entire beam requires interment, as we are concerned that perhaps his heart was directed toward Heaven, i.e., his intent was to consecrate it to the Temple, and therefore it may not be used.

טַעְמָא דְּשֵׁם כָּתוּב עָלֶיהָ, דְּבָעֲיָא גְּנִיזָה; הָא אֵין שֵׁם כָּתוּב עָלֶיהָ — לָא בָּעֲיָא גְּנִיזָה!

The Gemara analyzes this baraita: The reason that the beam requires interment is that the name of God is written on it, from which it may be inferred that if God’s name is not written on it, it does not require interment. Why, then, did Rav Yehuda say that if a gentile separated teruma it requires interment?

הוּא הַדִּין דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאֵין שֵׁם כָּתוּב עָלֶיהָ נָמֵי בָּעֲיָא גְּנִיזָה, וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּשֵׁם כָּתוּב עָלֶיהָ, יָגוֹד וְיִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בַּמּוֹתָר, דְּשֵׁם שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹמוֹ לָאו קָדוֹשׁ.

The Gemara answers: Even though the name of God is not written on the beam, the same halakha is true, and the beam requires interment, due to the concern that he might have intended to consecrate it. And as for why the baraita specifically discusses the case where God’s name was written on the beam, this teaches us that if his intention was for it to be used in a synagogue, then even though God’s name is written on it, nevertheless the rest of the beam is not prohibited. Rather, the name should be cut off and interred, and one may use the remainder for a synagogue. The reason is that if God’s name is written on an item, only the place where it is written is sanctified, but that part of the item that is not in its place is not sanctified.

דִּתְנַן: הָיָה כָּתוּב עַל יְדוֹת הַכֵּלִים וְעַל כַּרְעֵי הַמִּטָּה — הֲרֵי זֶה יָגוֹד וְיִגְנוֹז.

As we learned in a baraita: If one of the names of God was written on the handles of vessels or on legs of a bed, one must cut off the name and inter it, and the remainder is permitted.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבָהוּ: הָאוֹמֵר ״סֶלַע זוֹ לִצְדָקָה״ — מוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ. סְבוּר מִינַּהּ: לְעַצְמוֹ — אִין, לְאַחֵר — לָא. אִיתְּמַר: אָמַר רַב אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בֵּין לְעַצְמוֹ בֵּין לְאַחֵר.

§ Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Abbahu says: One who says: I am contributing this sela to charity, is permitted to change its purpose, i.e., to use the money himself and later replace it. The Gemara comments: It was initially understood from this that if one wants to change its purpose for his own benefit, yes, this is permitted, as he originally had this stipulation in mind. But it is not permitted to lend it to another. Yet it was stated that Rav Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is permitted to change its purpose whether for himself or for another.

אָמַר רַבִּי זְעֵירָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא דְּאָמַר ״עָלַי״, אֲבָל אָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ״ — בְּעֵינַאּ בָּעֵי לְמִיתְּבַהּ.

Rabbi Zeira says: They taught this halakha, that one may change the purpose of the coin, only in a case where he said: It is incumbent upon me to donate a sela to charity. But if he said: This sela is for charity, then he is required to give the sela to charity as is, and he may not use it and replace it.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: אַדְּרַבָּה, אִיפְּכָא מִיסְתַּבְּרָא — אָמַר ״זוֹ״ מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיחַיַּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתַהּ, אֲבָל אָמַר ״עָלַי״ — לָא! אֶלָּא, לָא שְׁנָא.

Rava objects to this: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable. In a case where one said: This sela is for charity, it makes sense to allow him to use it, so that he should bear financial responsibility for its loss from that point onward. But if he said: It is incumbent upon me to donate a sela to charity, he should not be allowed to use the sela, as in any event he must donate a sela. Rather, as there is a reason in either situation to permit its use, there is no difference between the cases, and in both cases he may use the sela.

תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: נֶדֶר צְדָקָה, וְאֵין הֶקְדֵּשׁ צְדָקָה. מַאי קָאָמַר? לָא נֶדֶר וְלָא הֶקְדֵּשׁ צְדָקָה!

The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: A vow is charity, but consecrated property is not charity. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? After all, neither a vow nor consecrated property is charity.

אֶלָּא לָאו הָכִי קָאָמַר: צְדָקָה הֲרֵי הִיא בְּבַל תְּאַחֵר, וְאֵינָהּ כְּהֶקְדֵּשׁ, דְּאִילּוּ הֶקְדֵּשׁ אֲסִיר לְאִשְׁתַּמּוֹשֵׁי בֵּיהּ, וְאִילּוּ צְדָקָה שְׁרֵי לְאִשְׁתַּמּוֹשֵׁי בֵּיהּ.

Rather, is it not correct that this is what the baraita is saying: Charity is like a vow to consecrate property, in that it is subject to the prohibition of: You shall not delay, which is derived from the verse: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay to pay it” (Deuteronomy 23:22). But nevertheless it is not like consecrated property, as in the case of consecrated property it is prohibited to use it, while in the case of charity it is permitted to use it. Since with regard to the option of using the money the baraita does not distinguish between a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate a sela to charity, and a case where he says: This sela is for charity, it evidently supports the opinion of Rava.

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: אַמְרִיתָא לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב זְבִיד מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, אָמַר: אַתּוּן הָכִי מַתְנִיתוּ לַהּ, אֲנַן הָכִי מַתְנֵינַן לַהּ — אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אָמַר רַב: הָאוֹמֵר ״סֶלַע זוֹ לִצְדָקָה״ מוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ, בֵּין לְעַצְמוֹ בֵּין לְאַחֵר, בֵּין אָמַר ״עָלַי״ בֵּין אָמַר ״הֲרֵי זוֹ״.

Rav Kahana said: I said this halakha of Rav Naḥman’s, with regard to one who says: This sela is for charity, along with the accompanying discussion, before Rav Zevid from Neharde’a. He said to me: You teach this halakha in this manner, that Rav Naḥman merely stated that it is permitted to change the purpose of the sela, and the Sages clarified that it is permitted in all cases. But we teach this halakha in this manner, that it was all stated citing Rav Naḥman: Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: One who said: I am contributing this sela to charity, is permitted to change its purpose, whether for himself or for another, and whether he said: It is incumbent upon me, or whether he said: This sela is for charity.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״סֶלַע זוֹ לִצְדָקָה״ — עַד שֶׁלֹּא בָּאתָה לְיַד גַּבַּאי, מוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ; מִשֶּׁבָּאתָה לְיַד גַּבַּאי, אָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ.

§ The Sages taught a baraita which further deals with these matters. One who said: This sela is for charity, is permitted to change its purpose and replace it, as long as it has not yet come into the possession of the charity collectors. But once it has come into the possession of the charity collectors it is prohibited to change its purpose.

אִינִי? וְהָא רַבִּי יַנַּאי יָזֵיף וּפָרַע! שָׁאנֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי, דְּנִיחָא לְהוּ לַעֲנִיִּים דְּכַמָּה דִּמְשַׁהֵי מְעַשֵּׂה וּמַיְיתֵי לְהוּ.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rabbi Yannai, who was a charity collector, borrowed money belonging to charity and repaid. The Gemara answers: The case of Rabbi Yannai is different; it is beneficial to the poor that he be allowed to borrow and repay, as the longer he leaves the charity fund empty, the more he impels people to give charity, and he thereby brings more money to the poor.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהִתְנַדֵּב מְנוֹרָה אוֹ נֵר לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת — אָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ. סָבַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא לְמֵימָר: לָא שְׁנָא לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת וְלָא שְׁנָא לִדְבַר מִצְוָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַמֵּי: הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן — לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת, אֲבָל לִדְבַר מִצְוָה מוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ.

The Sages taught a baraita that deals with a similar matter: In the case of a Jew who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba thought to say that there is no difference whether he wishes to change for a voluntary matter or for a matter involving a mitzva, as in both cases it is prohibited. Rav Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When the Sages taught the baraita, they taught only that it is prohibited when he changes it for a voluntary matter, but it is permitted to change it for a matter involving a mitzva.

מִדְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גּוֹי שֶׁהִתְנַדֵּב מְנוֹרָה אוֹ נֵר לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּקַּע שֵׁם בְּעָלֶיהָ — אָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ, מִשֶּׁנִּשְׁתַּקַּע שֵׁם בְּעָלֶיהָ — מוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ.

This halakha is derived from the fact that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a gentile who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, if it is before its owner’s name has been forgotten, i.e., people still remember that he donated the item, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Once its owner’s name has been forgotten, it is permitted to change it.

לְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת, מַאי אִירְיָא גּוֹי? אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נָמֵי!

The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what purpose is it stated that one may not change it before the owner’s name was forgotten? If we say that it is prohibited to change it for a voluntary matter, why does the baraita specifically mention a gentile? It is prohibited to change it in this manner even if it was donated by a Jew.

אֶלָּא לִדְבַר מִצְוָה, וְטַעְמָא דְּגוֹי הוּא דְּפָעֵי, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל דְּלָא פָּעֵי — שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.

Rather, the baraita must be dealing with a change for a matter involving a mitzva, and therefore it is prohibited only if the donor is a gentile and his name has not yet been forgotten. And the reason for this halakha is that it is specifically a gentile who would protest and scream: Where is the candelabrum that I donated? But in the case of a Jew, who would not protest and scream if they used his donation for a different mitzva, one may well change it.

שַׁעַזְרַק טַיָּיעָא אִינַּדַּב שְׁרָגָא לְבֵי כְנִישְׁתָּא דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, שַׁנְּיֵיהּ רַחֲבָא וְאִיקְּפֵד רָבָא. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: שַׁנְּיֵיהּ רָבָא וְאִיקְּפֵד רַחֲבָא, וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: שַׁנְּיֻיהּ חַזָּנֵי דְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא, וְאִיקְּפֵד רַחֲבָא וְאִיקְּפֵד רַבָּה.

The Gemara relates that Sha’azrak, an Arab [tayya’a] merchant, donated a candelabrum to Rav Yehuda’s synagogue. Raḥava changed its purpose before Sha’azrak’s name was forgotten as the donor, and Rava became angry at Raḥava for not waiting. Some say the opposite: Rava changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at Rava. And some say that the attendants of Pumbedita, the charity collectors, changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at them, and Rabba became angry at them as well.

מַאן דְּשַׁנְּיֵיהּ סָבַר דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ, וּמַאן דְּאִיקְּפֵד סָבַר זִמְנִין דְּמִקְּרֵי וְאָתֵי.

The Gemara explains: The one who changed its purpose holds that it was permitted to change it, as it was not common for Sha’azrak to be in the city and it was unlikely that he would protest the change. And the one who became angry holds that even so, they should not have changed it, as sometimes he happens to come there.

מַתְנִי׳ הַגּוֹסֵס וְהַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג — לֹא נִידָּר וְלֹא נֶעֱרָךְ. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא אוֹמֵר: נֶעֱרָךְ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּמָיו קְצוּבִין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: נוֹדֵר וּמַעֲרִיךְ וּמַקְדִּישׁ, וְאִם הִזִּיק — חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: One who is moribund and one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court is neither the object of a vow nor valuated. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya says: He is not the object of a vow, because he has no market value; but he is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed by the Torah based on age and sex. Rabbi Yosei says: One with that status vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation.

גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא גּוֹסֵס לֹא נִידָּר — דְּלָאו בַּר דָּמִים הוּא, וְלֹא נֶעֱרָךְ — דְּלָאו בַּר הַעֲמָדָה וְהַעֲרָכָה הוּא, אֶלָּא יוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג, בִּשְׁלָמָא לֹא נִידָּר — דְּלָאו בַּר דָּמִים הוּא, אֶלָּא לֹא נֶעֱרָךְ אַמַּאי לָא?

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, it makes sense that one who is moribund is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value. And it also stands to reason that he is not valuated, as he is not subject to setting, i.e., standing, and therefore is not subject to valuation. The verse states: “Then he shall be set before the priest, and the priest shall value him” (Leviticus 27:8). This teaches that anyone who cannot stand, such as one who is dying, is not included in the halakha of valuation. But with regard to one who is taken to be executed, granted, he is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value, since no one would purchase him. But with regard to the mishna’s statement that he is not valuated, why not?

דְּתַנְיָא: מִנַּיִן הַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג וְאָמַר ״עֶרְכִּי עָלַי״, שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר כְּלוּם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל חֵרֶם לֹא יִפָּדֶה״. יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ קוֹדֶם שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִן הָאָדָם״, וְלֹא כׇּל הָאָדָם.

The Gemara answers that the reason is as it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that in the case of one who is being taken to be executed and who said: My valuation is upon me to donate to the Temple, that he did not say anything, and the valuation is not collected from his estate? The verse states: “Anything dedicated [ḥerem], that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29). This teaches that with regard to one who is worthy of excommunication [ḥerem], i.e., condemned to death, one cannot redeem him, i.e., pay his valuation. One might have thought that this applies even before his verdict is issued, i.e., that this halakha applies even if one issued this statement before being sentenced to death. Therefore, the verse states: “Of men,” and not all men, i.e., only some men destined to be executed have no valuation, and not all of them.

וּלְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא, דְּאָמַר נֶעֱרָךְ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּמָיו קְצוּבִין, הַאי ״כׇּל חֵרֶם״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya, who says in the mishna that even a person taken to be executed is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed, what does he do with the phrase “anything dedicated”?

לְכִדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ לַמּוּמָתִים בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם שֶׁנּוֹתְנִין מָמוֹן וּמִתְכַּפֵּר לָהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״אִם כֹּפֶר יוּשַׁת עָלָיו״, יָכוֹל אַף בִּידֵי אָדָם כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כׇּל חֵרֶם לֹא יִפָּדֶה״.

The Gemara answers that he requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: Since we found with regard to those executed at the hand of Heaven that they give money and their sins are atoned, as it is stated in the case of the owner of a forewarned ox that killed a person: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death. If there be laid upon him a ransom, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him” (Exodus 21:29–30), one might have thought that even with regard to those liable to receive the death penalty at the hands of man it is so, that one can pay in lieu of execution. Therefore, the verse states: “Anything dedicated that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29).

אֵין לִי אֶלָּא מִיתוֹת חֲמוּרוֹת, שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְּנָה שִׁגְגָתָן לְכַפָּרָה, מִיתוֹת קַלּוֹת, שֶׁנִּיתְּנָה שִׁגְגָתָן לְכַפָּרָה, מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל חֵרֶם״.

I have derived only that one cannot give payment in lieu of execution with regard to severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., blasphemy or cursing one’s father, for which no atonement is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation. From where is it derived that the same applies to less severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., violating Shabbat or killing, for which atonement of an offering or exile is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation? The verse states: “Anything dedicated,” to include all prohibitions punishable by court-administered execution.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: נוֹדֵר וּמַעֲרִיךְ כּוּ׳. וְתַנָּא קַמָּא מִי קָאָמַר דְּלָא?

§ The mishna teaches, with regard to one who is taken to be executed, that Rabbi Yosei says: Such a person vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation. The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna say that such a person does not vow to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury and take vows of valuation, such that Rabbi Yosei could be understood as disputing his opinion? The first tanna merely said that such an individual is not subject to vows and valuations. What is the difference between their opinions?

אֶלָּא, בְּנוֹדֵר וּמַעֲרִיךְ וּמִקַּדִּישׁ — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי, כִּי פְלִיגִי — בְּאִם הִזִּיק. תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִם הִזִּיק — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּתַשְׁלוּמִין, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: אִם הִזִּיק — חַיָּיב בְּתַשְׁלוּמִין.

Rather, with regard to whether or not one who is taken to be executed can vow to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and take vows of valuation, and consecrate his property, everyone, including the first tanna, agrees that he can. When they disagree, it is in a case where he causes damage. The first tanna holds that if he causes damage he is not liable for payment, and Rabbi Yosei holds that if he causes damage he is liable to pay compensation.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: בְּמִלְוָה עַל פֶּה גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין קָמִיפַּלְגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִלְוָה עַל פֶּה אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: מִלְוָה עַל פֶּה גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do these tanna’im disagree, as it is an accepted principle that one who causes damage must pay? Rav Yosef said: They disagree as to whether the payment can be collected from his estate. This depends on the question of whether or not one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement, i.e., a loan given without a document that places a lien on the land, can collect from the heirs. The first tanna holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs, and Rabbi Yosei holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs.

רָבָא אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִלְוָה עַל פֶּה אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין, וְהָכָא בְּמִלְוָה כְּתוּבָה בַּתּוֹרָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִלְוָה כְּתוּבָה בַּתּוֹרָה לָאו כִּכְתוּבָה בִּשְׁטָר דָּמְיָא, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: כִּכְתוּבָה בִּשְׁטָר דָּמְיָא.

Rava says: In fact, everyone agrees that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs; and here the tanna’im disagree with regard to the status of a loan that is written in the Torah, i.e., a financial obligation decreed by Torah law, such as paying damages. The first tanna holds that a loan that is written in the Torah is not considered as though it is written in a document, and may not be collected from the heirs. Rabbi Yosei holds that such a loan is considered as though it is written in a document, and therefore it may be collected from the heirs.

וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַהָא: הַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג, הוּא שֶׁחָבַל בַּאֲחֵרִים — חַיָּיב, אֲחֵרִים שֶׁחָבְלוּ בּוֹ — פְּטוּרִין. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אַף הוּא אִם חָבַל בַּאֲחֵרִים — פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא נִיתַּן לַחֲזָרַת עֲמִידַת בֵּית דִּין.

And there are those who teach the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef with regard to this baraita: In the case of one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court, if he injured another he is liable for payment. But if others injured him they are exempt, as they would be if they injured a dead person. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Even if it was he who injured others, he is exempt, as he cannot be brought back to stand before the court for judgment, since he must be executed without delay.