Keretot 17

וְהָא דְּתַנְיָא חַיָּיב – בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת (דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין), דְּקָסָבַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

And that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems a person liable if he wrote two letters over two Shabbatot, can also be explained: It is referring to a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat, and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. In such a situation he deems an individual liable despite the fact that different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, as he holds that although the intervening days are generally considered awareness of his transgression, there is no awareness for a half-measure. Since he performed only half the prohibited labor on the first Shabbat, he is not considered to have become aware of his transgression on the intervening days.

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: סְבִירָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּף אֶחָד הֵן,

But according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva, and presumably also Rabban Gamliel, holds that separate Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, how can both baraitot be explained?

בִּשְׁלָמָא הָא דְּתַנְיָא חַיָּיב, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בֵּין בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת, דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּף אֶחָד הֵן, וּבֵין בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת, דְּקָסָבַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

The Gemara elaborates: Granted, that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot to be liable, is understandable. You can find both a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors, as he holds that Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, and a case where he acted unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. The reason in the second case is that he holds there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore the actions on the two Shabbatot are considered to have taken place during one lapse of awareness.

וְאֶלָּא הָדְתַנְיָא פָּטוּר, בְּמַאי מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ? לָא בַּחֲדָא וְלָא בַּחֲדָא!

But with regard to that which is taught in the first baraita, that one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot is exempt, in what case can you interpret it, i.e., in what circumstances would this ever apply? This ruling does not apply in this case, where he is aware that it is Shabbat but unaware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabbi Akiva, and presumably Rabban Gamliel, maintains that each Shabbat is considered a single entity and therefore it is considered as though he wrote two letters on one Shabbat, and he is liable. And this ruling also does not apply in that case, where one is unaware that it is Shabbat and aware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabban Gamliel maintains there is no awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two letters are considered to have been written in one lapse of awareness.

אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, דְּאָמַר: שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין.

The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore an individual who wrote one letter on one Shabbat and another letter on a different Shabbat is exempt.

וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי: וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיגִי אַאַחְרָנְיָיתָא. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ – הַיְינוּ דִּפְלִיגִי בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת, דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: אֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר.

The Gemara raises an objection: But from the fact that the baraita teaches: And Rabban Gamliel concedes to the Rabbis that if he wrote one letter on one Shabbat and one more letter on a different Shabbat he is exempt, it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another halakha. Granted, if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the opinion of the Rabbis is that of Rabbi Akiva, this is referring to the fact that they disagree in the other baraita with regard to the case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, as Rabban Gamliel holds that although the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore he is liable.

וּמוֹדֶה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר, אַלְמָא שַׁבָּתוֹת כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיגִי. בְּמַאי?

And Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Akiva in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, that he is exempt. Evidently, Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore the letters written on different Shabbatot do not combine, which is why he is exempt. But if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and from the fact that one baraita states that Rabban Gamliel concedes that he is exempt it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another similar halakha, this raises the question: About what case do they disagree?

אִי בְּשִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת – אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סְבִירָא לֵיהּ דְּאֵין יְדִיעָה לַחֲצִי שִׁיעוּר, דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת בִּשְׁתֵּי שַׁבָּתוֹת, אוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ וְאוֹת אַחַת בְּשַׁבָּת זוֹ – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב!

If you suggest that they disagree with regard to a case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, then that cannot be correct. After all, even Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel that there is no awareness for a half-measure, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who writes two letters on two separate Shabbatot, one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable.

וְאֶלָּא, בְּאַחַת עַל הָאָרִיג – חַיּוֹבֵי מְחַיֵּיב, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הָאוֹרֵג שְׁלֹשָׁה חוּטִין בַּתְּחִלָּה, וְאֶחָד עַל הָאָרִיג – חַיָּיב!

But rather, you might suggest that Rabban Gamliel’s concession that he is exempt is referring to a disagreement with regard to adding one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. If one weaves three threads together he has violated the prohibited labor of weaving on Shabbat. It might be suggested that if one adds a single thread to a preexisting woven fabric, Rabban Gamliel would deem him liable whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt. And yet Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one writes one letter next to a letter written on the previous Shabbat he is exempt. This suggestion is also difficult, as Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable in the case of adding a single thread, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 105a) that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning of a new fabric, or adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric, is liable.

אָמַר רָבָא: מִכְּלָל דִּפְלִיג בַּחֲדָא, דְּתַנְיָא: הוֹצִיא חֲצִי גְרוֹגֶרֶת וְחָזַר וְהוֹצִיא חֲצִי גְרוֹגֶרֶת בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] – חַיָּיב. בִּשְׁתֵּי הֶעְלֵמוֹת – פָּטוּר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד בִּרְשׁוּת (אֶחָד) [אַחַת] – חַיָּיב, בִּשְׁתֵּי רְשׁוּיוֹת – פָּטוּר.

Rava said: When it was derived by inference that Rabban Gamliel disagrees about one other halakha, that disagreement is referring to the following case, as it is taught in a baraita: One who carried out half of a dried fig into the public domain on Shabbat and then carried out another half of a dried fig, in one lapse of awareness, is liable; if he carried them out in two lapses of awareness he is exempt. Rabbi Yosei says: Even in a case where this occurred in one lapse of awareness, if they were both carried to one public domain he is liable; but if they were carried to two public domains that are separated from each other he is exempt.

דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כְּתַנָּא קַמָּא, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

As in such a case, Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who says that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate; therefore, as he carried out a full dried fig, which is the minimum measure for the prohibited labor of carrying from one domain to another, he is liable. And Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says the separate domains cause the acts to be considered separate, and he is exempt. Another baraita then states that although Rabban Gamliel maintains that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate, he concedes that individual Shabbatot are considered separate entities, and therefore writing two letters on two different Shabbatot is considered two separate acts and the individual is exempt.

תָּא שְׁמַע, אָמַר לוֹ: חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה נִדָּה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference. Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor, is it not right that one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each prohibited labor?

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמַר: שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת בָּעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם מִי הָוְיָין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אוֹ לָא – הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״וּמָה נִדָּה״.

Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions constitute prohibited labors, and the basis of the dilemma was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, that is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, in the singular; in order to indicate that just as in the case of a menstruating woman one is liable for each act of intercourse due to the intervening days, so too with regard to Shabbat.

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר: זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּשַׁבָּתוֹת אִי כְּגוּפִין דָּמְיָין וְאִי לָא – לִיתְנֵי ״נִדּוֹת״!

But according to Rava, who says it was in reference to a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the basis of the dilemma was whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, let Rabbi Eliezer teach this halakha with the plural phrase: Menstruating women. This would indicate that just as a man who engages in intercourse with five different menstruating women is liable to bring a sin offering for his transgression with each woman, as they are separate entities, the same applies to Shabbatot, which are also separate entities.

אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: תְּנִי ״נִדּוֹת״. שְׁמוּאֵל תָּנֵי ״נִדָּה״, רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה תָּנֵי ״נִדָּה״. רַב נָתָן בַּר אוֹשַׁעְיָא אָמַר: תָּנֵי ״נִדּוֹת״.

The Gemara responds that Rava could say to you: Indeed, teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women. The Gemara notes that Shmuel teaches the mishna with the singular term menstruating woman, and Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches the mishna with the term menstruating woman; but Rav Natan bar Oshaya says: Teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women.

וּלְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמַר: שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת הוּא דְּבָעֵי מִינֵּיהּ, דְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם מִי הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק וְאִי לָא, נִדָּה – מַאי יָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם הָוַיִין יְדִיעָה לְחַלֵּק אִית בַּהּ?

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Ḥisda, who says: It was in reference to a case where he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the question was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, how could Rabbi Eliezer attempt to resolve the dilemma by a comparison to a menstruating woman? In the case of a menstruating woman, what intervening days apply to her that can be considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate the acts of intercourse into distinct transgressions?

אָמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּא עָלֶיהָ וְטָבְלָה, וְרָאֲתָה וְחָזַר וּבָא עָלֶיהָ, וְטָבְלָה, וְחָזַר וּבָא עָלֶיהָ, דִּטְבִילוֹת הָוְיָין כְּיָמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם.

Rava said: This is possible in a case where he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with her while she was menstruating, and then she immersed in a ritual bath and became pure, and then she saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again, and then she immersed and then saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again. As here the immersions which purify her are considered like intervening days.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרָבָא, הַיְינוּ דְקָתָנֵי ״קְטַנּוֹת״.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rava from the continuation of the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: The case of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid. Granted, according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma was about whether Shabbatot are considered separate entities, this is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer teaches his resolution by using the plural term minor girls, to indicate that just as one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each girl, as she is a separate entity, the same applies to prohibited labor performed on different Shabbatot.

אֶלָּא לְרַב חִסְדָּא, מַאי ״קְטַנּוֹת״? קְטַנּוֹת דְּעָלְמָא.

But according to Rav Ḥisda, who said Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma referred to whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, what is the reason Rabbi Eliezer employed the plural term minor girls? The Gemara answers that the plural term is referring to minor girls in general, i.e., to men who engage in intercourse with minor girls, but it should not be taken to mean that one man engages in intercourse with multiple minor women.

דְּלָא כְּהָדֵין תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר לֹא כָּךְ שְׁאֵלוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, אֶלָּא כָּךְ שְׁאֵלוֹ: הַבָּא עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה וְחָזַר וּבָא עַל אִשְׁתּוֹ נִדָּה בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מַהוּ? חַיָּיב אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּן, אוֹ חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת?

§ The Gemara notes that the mishna, which states that Rabbi Akiva raised a dilemma with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and Rabbi Eliezer offered a resolution based on the halakhot of a menstruating woman, is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: That is not what Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer. Rather, this is what he asked him: In the case of one who unwittingly engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, and then again engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring only one sin offering for all of the acts of intercourse, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one?

אָמַר לֹיה: חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה שַׁבָּת שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ אֶלָּא אַזְהָרָה אַחַת, שֶׁהוּא מוּזְהָר עַל הַשַּׁבָּת וְהַשַּׁבָּת אֵינָהּ מוּזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, נִדָּה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שְׁתֵּי אַזְהָרוֹת, שֶׁהוּא מוּזְהָר עַל הַנִּדָּה וְנִדָּה מוּזְהֶרֶת עָלָיו – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: He is liable for each and every one, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: And just as in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition because he is prohibited to perform labor on Shabbat but Shabbat is not prohibited with regard to him, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every prohibited labor; in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited to engage in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited to engage in intercourse with him, is it not right that he should be liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every act of intercourse?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּשַּׁבָּת, שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, תֹּאמַר בַּנִּדָּה, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה!

Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple categories of labor that result in liability to bring multiple sin offerings, shall you also say the same in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple transgressions and multiple sin offerings, as there is only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her?

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַבָּא עַל הַקְּטַנּוֹת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ תּוֹצָאוֹת הַרְבֵּה לְחַטָּאוֹת הַרְבֵּה, וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת!

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who engages in intercourse with five minor menstruating girls will prove it, as with regard to it there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, and yet one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of the girls.

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בַּקְּטַנּוֹת שֶׁכֵּן גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַבָּא עַל הַבְּהֵמָה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֵין גּוּפִין מוּחְלָקִין וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת! אָמְרוּ לוֹ: הַבְּהֵמָה כַּנִּדָּה.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for each one with regard to minors, who are separate entities, shall you also say that he should be liable for each act with regard to one who engages in intercourse five times with his wife while she is menstruating? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who copulates with an animal multiple times during a single lapse of awareness will prove that one should be held separately liable for each act, as there are no separate entities, and yet one is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said to him: The case of the animal is like the case of the menstruating woman, and one is liable to bring only one sin offering.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אָמְרוּ לוֹ

MISHNA: If there is uncertainty whether one ate forbidden fat and uncertainty whether one did not eat forbidden fat, or even if one ate forbidden fat and there is uncertainty whether there is the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate and uncertainty

מַתְנִי׳ סָפֵק אָכַל חֵלֶב, סָפֵק לֹא אָכַל, וַאֲפִילּוּ אָכַל, סָפֵק יֵשׁ בּוֹ כַּשִּׁיעוּר וְסָפֵק

אֵין בּוֹ,

whether there is not the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate, he must bring a provisional guilt offering.

שׁוּמָּן וָחֵלֶב לְפָנָיו, וְאָכַל אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזֶה מֵהֶן אָכַל, אִשְׁתּוֹ וַאֲחוֹתוֹ עִמּוֹ בַּבַּיִת, שָׁגַג בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בְּאֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן שָׁגַג, שַׁבָּת וְיוֹם חוֹל, וְעָשָׂה מְלָאכָה בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ בְּאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן עָשָׂה – מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי.

If one has a piece of permitted fat and a piece of forbidden fat before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate; or if his wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly engaged in intercourse; or if he confused Shabbat and a weekday and he performed labor prohibited on Shabbat on one of the days and he does not know on which of them he performed the labor, in all of those cases he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering.

כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאִם אָכַל חֵלֶב וָחֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אַחַת, כֵּן עַל לֹא הוֹדַע שֶׁלָּהֶן אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא אֶלָּא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶחָד.

Just as in a case where one unknowingly ate a piece of forbidden fat and then another piece of forbidden fat in a single lapse of awareness he is liable to bring only one sin offering, so too, in a case where their status is unknown to him and he ate them both unwittingly during a single lapse in awareness, he is liable to bring only one provisional guilt offering.

אִם הָיְתָה יְדִיעָה בֵּינָתַיִם, כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא חַטָּאת עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, כָּךְ מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.

But if he had gained knowledge between the first and second instance of eating that there is a possibility the fat might be prohibited, then the halakha is different: Just as he would be liable to bring a sin offering for each and every piece when he gained knowledge of their prohibited status in between each act of consumption, so too, he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every instance in which he consumed food that might be forbidden after learning of their uncertain status in between each unwitting act of consumption.

כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאָכַל חֵלֶב וָדָם וּפִיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר בְּהֶעְלֵם אַחַת חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת, כָּךְ עַל לֹא הוֹדַע שֶׁלָּהֶן מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאֶחָת.

Just as in a case where one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, with regard to a case where their status is unknown to him and he ate them unwittingly during one lapse of awareness, he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every item.

גְּמָ׳ אִיתְּמַר, רַב אַסִּי אָמַר: חֲתִיכָה אַחַת שָׁנִינוּ, סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן. חִיָּיא בַּר רַב אָמַר: חֲתִיכָה מִשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת שָׁנִינוּ.

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s mention of one who ate a piece of fat whose status was uncertain, it was stated that Rav Asi says: We learned that one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering in the case of one single piece that is uncertain if it is of forbidden fat and uncertain if it is of permitted fat. Ḥiyya bar Rav disagreed and said: We learned this halakha in the case of an uncertainty involving one piece out of two pieces, one of which is forbidden fat and the other permitted fat, but in the case of a single piece, one who consumes it is not liable to bring an offering.

בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? רַב אַסִּי סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמָּסוֹרֶת, ״מִצְוַת״ כְּתִיב.

The Gemara inquires: With regard to what matter do Rav Asi and Ḥiyya bar Rav disagree? The Gemara answers: It is stated in a verse discussing the obligation to bring a provisional guilt offering: “And if anyone sin, and do any of the commandments [mitzvot] of the Lord that are not to be done, though does not know it; yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). Rav Asi holds: The tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives halakhot based on the spelling of the words. Therefore, the obligation to bring a provisional guilt offering applies only when there is uncertainty with regard to a single piece, because the word is written as “mitzvat,” in the singular form.

וְחִיָּיא בַּר רַב אָמַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמִּקְרָא, ״מִצְווֹת״ קָרֵינַן.

And Ḥiyya bar Rav says: The vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, meaning that one derives halakhot based on the pronunciation of the words, even if it diverges from the spelling. Therefore, since we read the word in the plural, as mitzvot, the obligation to bring a provisional guilt offering applies only when two pieces are present.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא לְרַב אַסִּי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ חִיָּיא בַּר רַב לְרַב אַסִּי: חֵלֶב וְשׁוּמָּן לְפָנָיו וְאָכַל אַחַת מֵהֶן מַאי לַָאו מִדְּסֵיפָא שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת?

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Asi, and some say it was Ḥiyya bar Rav who raised the objection to Rav Asi: The latter clause in the mishna states: If one has a piece of permitted fat and a piece of forbidden fat before him and he ate one of them. What, is it not correct to infer from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is referring to two pieces that the first clause, which introduces the topic, is also referring to two pieces?

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב: לָא תֵּיזְלוּ בָּתַר אִיפְּכָא, דְּיָכוֹל לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי לְכוּ: סֵיפָא בִּשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת רֵישָׁא בַּחֲתִיכָה אַחַת. אִי הָכִי, יֵשׁ לוֹמַר: חֲתִיכָה אַחַת מִחַיַּיב, שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר? זוֹ וְאֵין צָרִיךְ (לְמֵימַר) [לוֹמַר] זוֹ.

Rav said to them: Do not go after the opposite, i.e., do not cite a proof from a source that could be understood in the reverse manner, as Rav Asi can answer you by claiming that whereas the latter clause is referring to two pieces, the first clause is referring to one piece. The Gemara questions this claim: If so, one can say that once the mishna has taught that the consumption of one piece of fat that might be forbidden renders him obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering, does it need to be said that the same applies in a case involving two pieces, where one of them is definitely forbidden? The Gemara answers that the mishna is employing the style: This, and it is unnecessary to say that, i.e., it first teaches the more difficult and novel case, then teaches the easier, more straightforward one.

וּלְחִיָּיא בַּר רַב דְּאָמַר: מִדְּסֵיפָא בִּשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, רֵישָׁא נָמֵי בִּשְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, מִיתְנָא תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי? פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: סָפֵק אָכַל סָפֵק לֹא אָכַל חֵלֶב – מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, כֵּיצַד? כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה חֵלֶב וְשׁוּמָּן לְפָנָיו.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav, who says that from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is referring to two pieces, the first clause is also is referring two pieces, why do I need two clauses to teach the same halakha? The Gemara answers that the mishna is explaining itself, as follows: If there is uncertainty whether one ate forbidden fat and uncertainty whether one did not eat forbidden fat, he must bring a provisional guilt offering. How so? For example, in a case where there was forbidden fat and permitted fat before him, and he ate one of them.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן וְאַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב, אָכַל אַחַת מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן אָכַל – חַיָּיב. חֲתִיכָה אַחַת, סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן וַאֲכָלָהּ – פָּטוּר.

§ The Gemara cites a series of virtually identical statements attributed to Rav, followed by different rationales for his opinion, after each of which it raises several objections from a baraita or a mishna. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In a case where one had two pieces of fat before him, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, if he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. But if there was only one piece before him and there was uncertainty whether it was of forbidden fat and uncertainty whether it was of permitted fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וְעָשָׂה אַחַת מִכׇּל מִצְוֹת ה׳ בִּשְׁגָגָה״ – עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגּוֹג בִּשְׁתַּיִם, ״מִצְוַת״ כְּתִיב, ״מִצְווֹת״ קָרֵינַן.

Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav? He derives it from that which the verse states: “And if anyone sin, and do any of the commandments [mitzvot] of the Lord that are not to be done, though he does not know it; yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 4:22). Rav derives from the plural mitzvot that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering until he is unwitting with regard to one of two items, which in this case is two pieces of fat. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written “mitzvat,” in the singular form? The Gemara answers: We read it as mitzvot, in the plural. In other words, according to Rava, Rav maintains that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כּוֹי – חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו אָשָׁם תָּלוּי!

Abaye raised an objection to Rava from a baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both a domesticated animal and a non-domesticated animal, one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for eating its fat. The prohibition of forbidden fats applies only to those of a domesticated animal; the corresponding fats are permitted in the case of a non-domesticated animal. Since a koy is of uncertain status, one must bring a provisional guilt offering for eating its fat. Evidently, one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering even in a case where there was uncertainty involving a single item.

אָמַר לוֹ: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: יֵשׁ אֵם לַמָּסוֹרֶת, ״מִצְוַת״ כְּתִיב.

Rava said to Abaye: Rabbi Eliezer holds that the tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative. Consequently, as the singular form “mitzvat” is written, he maintains that a provisional guilt offering must be brought in a case of uncertainty involving a single item, such as the fat of a koy.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: סָפֵק בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה לָרִאשׁוֹן אוֹ בֶּן שִׁבְעָה לָאַחֲרוֹן – יוֹצִיא, וְהַוָּלָד כָּשֵׁר,

The Gemara raised an objection to Rav from a baraita: If one consummates levirate marriage with his yevama and seven months later she gives birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old, i.e., counting from conception, and is the offspring of the first husband, which would mean the levirate bond did not take effect, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam, not the deceased, in which case the levirate bond did take effect. In such a situation, due to the possibility that she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, he must divorce her. But the offspring is of unflawed lineage, as whether it was born from the first or the second husband, its conception involved no transgression.

וְחַיָּיב בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי. הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.

The baraita concludes: And to atone for the possibility that they engaged in forbidden intercourse they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. This indicates that one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering even when the uncertainty involves a single item. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who, as stated above, maintains that one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertainty involving a single item.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלּוֹ – טְמֵאִין, וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן.

The Gemara raised another objection to Rav from a mishna (Nidda 14a): It is the custom of Jewish women to engage in intercourse with their husbands with two cloths, one for her husband to wipe himself with to see if any of her blood is on him after intercourse, and one for her to check herself to ascertain after intercourse whether her menstrual flow has begun. If after intercourse blood was found on his cloth, the woman and her husband are both ritually impure for seven days, in accordance with the halakha of a menstruating woman and a man who engages in intercourse with her, and they are each liable to bring a sin offering for unwittingly performing an action punishable by karet.

עַל שֶׁלָּהּ אֹתְיוֹם – טְמֵאִין וְחַיָּיבִין בַּקׇּרְבָּן. נִמְצָא עַל שֶׁלָּהּ לְאַחַר זְמַן – טְמֵאִין מִסָּפֵק וּפְטוּרִין מִן הַקׇּרְבָּן, וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: חַיָּיב מִשּׁוּם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי! הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא.

The mishna continues: If blood was found on her cloth immediately [otyom] after intercourse, the woman and her husband are likewise ritually impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both impure due to uncertainty, as it is possible the blood appeared only after intercourse, and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And it is taught with regard to this last case in the mishna: They are each nevertheless liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. The Gemara again answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא אָמַר רַב: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל חֵלֶב וְאַחַת שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן, וְאָכַל אַחַת מֵהֶן וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזֶה מֵהֶן אָכַל – חַיָּיב. חֲתִיכָה, סָפֵק שֶׁל שׁוּמָּן סָפֵק שֶׁל חֵלֶב וַאֲכָלָהּ – פָּטוּר.

§ Rabbi Ḥiyya says that Rav says: In a case where one had two pieces of fat before him, one of permitted fat and one of forbidden fat, and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering. But if there was only one piece before him and there was uncertainty whether it was of permitted fat and uncertainty whether it was of forbidden fat, and he ate it, he is exempt.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַב? קָסָבַר: שְׁתֵּי חֲתִיכוֹת אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרָן, חֲתִיכָה אַחַת אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרָהּ.

Rabbi Zeira said: What is the reason for the ruling of Rav? He holds one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering only in a case involving two pieces, as it is possible to identify its prohibition. As, an expert might later examine the remaining piece and determine whether or not one ate the prohibited piece. By contrast, in a case of uncertainty involving only one piece, it is impossible to identify its prohibition and ascertain whether one ate a forbidden or permitted piece of fat.

מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין טַעְמָא דְּרָבָא לְטַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא? אִיכָּא בֵינַיְיהוּ כְּזַיִת וּמֶחֱצָה.

The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the reason given earlier by Rava for Rav’s ruling and the reason stated here by Rabbi Zeira? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is a case where there were two pieces before a person, one measuring an olive-bulk and the other measuring one-half of an olive-bulk. Since according to halakha a measure of less than an olive-bulk is of no relevance in such a case, it is considered as though only one piece is present before him.

לְרָבָא – לֵיכָּא ״מִצְווֹת״ וּפָטוּר, לְרַבִּי זֵירָא – אֶפְשָׁר לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרוֹ.

The Gemara elaborates: According to Rava, who contends that Rav maintains that the plural vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, this is not a case of uncertainty involving two items, as required by the plural form mitzvot, and therefore he is exempt. By contrast, according to Rabbi Zeira, this is a case where it is possible to identify its prohibition by examining the remaining piece, and he is therefore obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה לְרַבִּי זֵירָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כּוֹי, חַיָּיבִין עַל חֶלְבּוֹ אָשָׁם תָּלוּי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: לָא בָּעֵינַן לְבָרֵר אִיסּוּרוֹ.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to Rabbi Zeira from a baraita. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a koy, one is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for eating its fat. Evidently, one must bring a provisional guilt offering even in a case where the uncertainty involves only a single item. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Rabbi Eliezer holds we do not require a case where it is possible to identify its prohibition in order for one to be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.