Chullin 114

כֵּיוָן דְּעַל אֲכִילָה לָא לָקֵי, אַבִּישּׁוּל נָמֵי לָא לָקֵי.

This link between cooking and eating indicates that since one is not flogged for eating forbidden fat cooked in milk, as agreed upon above, one also is not flogged for cooking the two together.

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אַבִּישּׁוּל – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָקֵי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי אַאֲכִילָה. מַאן דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה – דְּהָא אֵין אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר לוֹקֶה – לְהָכִי אַפְּקַהּ רַחֲמָנָא לַאֲכִילָה בִּלְשׁוֹן בִּישּׁוּל, כֵּיוָן דְּאַבִּישּׁוּל לָקֵי – אַאֲכִילָה נָמֵי לָקֵי.

And some say the opposite: With regard to cooking, everyone agrees that one is flogged for this act, since the principle of a prohibition not taking effect where another prohibition already exists is not relevant. When they disagree, it is with regard to eating. The one who says he is not flogged applies the principle that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and the fat was already prohibited for consumption in its own right before being cooked with milk. And the one who says he is flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk using the language of cooking, to teach that since one is flogged for cooking forbidden fat in milk, one also is flogged for eating the product.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מָר אֲמַר חֲדָא, וּמָר אֲמַר חֲדָא, וְלָא פְּלִיגִי.

The Gemara suggests a third explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi: And if you wish, say that one Sage said one statement and one Sage said another statement, and they do not disagree, as they are referring to different cases. The Sage who said that one is flogged is referring to the transgression of cooking forbidden fat with milk, whereas the one who said one is not flogged is referring to the consumption of forbidden fat with milk. Everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore one is flogged only for cooking forbidden fat in milk, but not for eating the two together.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּמֵי חָלָב – פָּטוּר, דָּם שֶׁבִּשְּׁלוֹ בְּחָלָב – פָּטוּר, הַעֲצָמוֹת וְהַגִּידִים וְהַקַּרְנַיִם וְהַטְּלָפַיִם שֶׁבִּשְּׁלָן בְּחָלָב – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara raises an objection from a Tosefta (8:3): One who cooks meat in whey, the liquid leftover after milk has been curdled, is exempt from lashes, as whey is not defined as milk for purposes of the prohibition. Likewise, for blood that one cooked in milk, he is exempt, as blood is not considered meat. Similarly, with regard to the bones, the tendons, the horns, and the hooves that one cooked in milk, he is exempt.

הַפִּגּוּל, וְהַנּוֹתָר, וְהַטָּמֵא, שֶׁבִּשְּׁלָן בְּחָלָב – חַיָּיב!

The Tosefta continues: By contrast, with regard to prohibited piggul meat, i.e., meat from an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to sprinkle its blood or partake of its meat beyond its designated time, and similarly prohibited notar, meat from an offering whose period for consumption has expired, and the prohibited impure meat of an offering, that one cooked in milk, he is liable to be flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. This indicates that the prohibition applies to items already prohibited for consumption, contrary to the above opinion attributed to Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi.

הַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר אִיסּוּר חָל עַל אִיסּוּר.

The Gemara answers: This tanna of the baraita maintains in general that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, whereas Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi are of the opposite opinion. It is conceivable that these Sages, who are amora’im, disagree with that tanna, as the issue of whether a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists is a well-known dispute among the tanna’im themselves.

הַמְבַשֵּׁל בְּמֵי חָלָב פָּטוּר, מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דִּתְנַן: מֵי חָלָב הֲרֵי הֵן כְּחָלָב, וְהַמּוֹחַל הֲרֵי הוּא כְּשֶׁמֶן. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְהַכְשִׁיר אֶת הַזְּרָעִים, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן בִּישּׁוּל בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב – מֵי חָלָב אֵינוֹ כְּחָלָב.

§ It was stated in the above baraita: One who cooks meat in whey is exempt from lashes. The Gemara comments: This ruling supports the opinion of Reish Lakish, as we learned in a mishna, with regard to liquids that render food susceptible to ritual impurity (Makhshirin 6:5): The halakhic status of whey is like that of milk, which is one of the liquids that render food susceptible to impurity, and the halakhic status of olive secretion is like that of oil, which also renders food susceptible to impurity. With regard to this mishna, Reish Lakish says: They taught this halakha only with regard to rendering seeds, i.e., produce, susceptible to impurity. But with regard to cooking meat in milk, the halakhic status of whey is not like that of milk.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ, בַּחֲלֵב פָּרָה וְרָחֵל מִנַּיִן?

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: From the phrase “in its mother’s milk” I have derived only that the prohibition applies to the mother goat’s milk. From where do I derive that it also applies to the milk of a cow and a ewe?

אָמַרְתָּ, קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה אִמּוֹ, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּהַרְבָּעָה – נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּלוֹ, פָּרָה וְרָחֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרוּ עִמּוֹ בְּהַרְבָּעָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרוּ עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּלוֹ! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.

You can say an a fortiori inference: Just as a kid’s mother, which is not prohibited for mating with the kid, as they are of the same species, is nevertheless prohibited for cooking with it, as stated in the verse, is it not right that a cow or a ewe, which are prohibited for mating with it, as they are of different species, should be prohibited for cooking with it? Therefore, the verse states elsewhere: “In its mother’s milk,” a second time, to include a cow and a ewe.

וְהָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא? הָא אָתְיָא לֵיהּ!

The Gemara challenges the conclusion of the baraita. But why do I need a verse? It was just derived through the a fortiori inference.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּדִינָא פִּירְכָא, מֵהֵיכָא קָא מַיְיתֵית לַהּ? מֵאִמּוֹ, מָה לְאִמּוֹ שֶׁכֵּן נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, תֹּאמַר בְּפָרָה שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.

Rav Ashi said: It is needed because one can say that the refutation of the a fortiori inference is present from the outset, i.e., there is a difficulty with the comparison: From where do you derive the inference? It is derived from its mother goat, which the baraita presents as being treated more leniently than a cow or ewe since it may be mated with a kid. But there is a stringent aspect of the mother goat not shared by a cow or ewe: What is unique about its mother? It is unique in that it is prohibited for slaughter with it, since one may not slaughter an animal and its mother on the same day (see Leviticus 22:28). Will you say the same about a cow, which is not prohibited for slaughter with it? Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” to include a cow and a ewe.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ, בַּחֲלֵב אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה מִנַּיִן?

§ The above baraita accounts for two of the Torah’s three mentions of the phrase “in its mother’s milk.” The Gemara now addresses the third. It is taught in another baraita: From one instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” I have derived only that the prohibition applies to the milk of its mother, if the mother is less than a year old and has not yet entered the pen for the purpose of its owner’s separating the annual animal tithe. From where do I derive that it also applies to the milk of its older sister, i.e., one that is more than a year old that has already entered the pen for the animal tithe in the previous year?

אָמַרְתָּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר, וּמָה אִמּוֹ שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְדִיר לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר – נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּל, אֲחוֹתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְדִיר לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בְּבִשּׁוּל! תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.

You can say an a fortiori inference: Just as a kid’s mother, which enters the pen to be tithed with it, is nevertheless prohibited for cooking with it, is it not right that its sister, which does not enter the pen to be tithed with it, should be prohibited for cooking with it? Therefore, the verse states elsewhere: “In its mother’s milk,” a third time, to include the older sister in the prohibition.

וְהָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא, הָא אָתְיָא לַיהּ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מֵעִיקָּרָא דְּדִינָא פִּירְכָא, מֵהֵיכָא קָא מַיְיתֵית לַהּ? מֵאִמּוֹ, מָה לְאִמּוֹ, שֶׁכֵּן נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, תֹּאמַר בַּאֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה, שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.

The Gemara asks: But why do I need a verse? It was just derived from the a fortiori inference. Rav Ashi said: It is needed because one can say that the refutation of that a fortiori inference is present from the outset. From where do you derive the inference? It is derived from its mother. But one may respond: What is unique about its mother? It is unique in that it is prohibited for slaughter with it on the same day. Will you say the same halakhot apply to its older sister, which is not prohibited for slaughter with it? Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” including the older sister.

אַשְׁכְּחַן אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה, אֲחוֹתוֹ קְטַנָּה מִנַּיִן? אָתְיָא מִבֵּינַיָּא.

The Gemara continues: We have found a source for the halakha that its older sister is included in the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. From where is it derived that the same applies to its younger sister, one that has not yet entered the pen for the tithe? The Gemara responds: It is derived from between them, i.e., from the combination of the mother and the older sister.

מֵהֵי תֵּיתֵי? תֵּיתֵי מֵאִמּוֹ – מָה לְאִמּוֹ שֶׁכֵּן נֶאֶסְרָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה תּוֹכִיחַ. מָה לַאֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה שֶׁלֹּא נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְדִיר לְהִתְעַשֵּׂר? אִמּוֹ תּוֹכִיחַ.

The Gemara elaborates on the need for both cases in order to derive the third: From which of the two cases should it be derived? If it should be derived from its mother, one can claim: What is unique about its mother? It is unique in that it is prohibited for slaughter with it on the same day, unlike the younger sister. One may respond: Its older sister can prove the point, since it is not prohibited for slaughter with the kid, but it is still included in the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. But this can be refuted as well: What is unique about its older sister? It is unique in that it does not enter the pen to be tithed with it, unlike the younger sister. One may respond that its mother can then prove the point, as it can enter the pen to be tithed with the kid and is still included in the prohibition.

וְחָזַר הַדִּין, לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן: שֶׁהוּא בָּשָׂר, וְאָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב, אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא אֲחוֹתוֹ קְטַנָּה, שֶׁהוּא בָּשָׂר, וְאָסוּר לְבַשֵּׁל בְּחָלָב.

And consequently, the inference has reverted to its starting point: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that both the mother and older sister are meat and it is prohibited to cook them in milk. If so, I will also include its younger sister in the prohibition, since it is also meat, and therefore it is prohibited to cook it in milk.

אִי הָכִי, אֲחוֹתוֹ גְּדוֹלָה נָמֵי תֵּיתֵי מִבֵּינַיָּא.

The Gemara challenges: If so, the inclusion of its older sister in the prohibition can also be derived from between them, i.e., from the combination of the kid’s mother and a cow. Although both a cow and the mother possess unique stringencies not shared by the older sister, i.e., the prohibition of mating and of slaughtering with the kid, respectively, neither possesses both stringencies, and the halakha with regard to the older sister can be derived from their common element, i.e., that they are both meat and prohibited to cook in milk, as stated above. If so, what need is there to derive this halakha from the verse?

אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, אֶלָּא ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ,

The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so; the halakha with regard to the older sister is derived from the common denominator of the mother and a cow. Rather, why do I need the verse’s additional mention of the phrase “in its mother’s milk?” It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” I have derived only the prohibition to cook the kid in its mother’s milk;

הִיא עַצְמָהּ בַּחֲלָבָהּ מִנַּיִן? אָמַרְתָּ קַל וְחוֹמֶר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱסַר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי בִּשְׁחִיטָה, נֶאֱסָר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם בִּשְׁחִיטָה, מְקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי בְּבִשּׁוּל – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם בְּבִשּׁוּל? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בַּחֲלֵב אִמּוֹ״.

from where is it derived that the meat of a mother animal may not itself be cooked in its own milk? Say an a fortiori inference: Just as with regard to an issue where the fruit is not prohibited with the fruit, i.e., slaughter, as it is permitted to slaughter two offspring of one mother on one day, the fruit is nevertheless prohibited for slaughter with the mother, is it not right that with regard to an issue where the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, i.e., cooking, as it is prohibited to cook a mother’s offspring with its milk, the fruit, i.e., the milk, should be prohibited for cooking with the mother? Therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk,” to prohibit the cooking of the meat of the mother in its own milk.

הָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא, הָא אָתְיָא לַהּ? אָמַר רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, סוּס בֶּן סוּסְיָא אֲחִי פִּרְדָּה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse? It was just derived a fortiori. Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami said: The verse is necessary because one can say that the case of a horse born of both a stallion and mare but which is the brother of a mule, i.e., its mother also bore a mule after being impregnated by a donkey, proves this a fortiori inference invalid. As here the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, but the fruit is permitted with the mother. One may not mate a horse with a mule, but one may mate a horse with its mother.

הָתָם, זֶרַע הָאָב הוּא דְּקָא גָרֵים.

The Gemara rejects this: There it is the seed of the father that effects the prohibition of mating the mule with the daughter horse. The two may not be paired for reasons unrelated to their status as offspring of one mother. This ruling therefore proves nothing about the hypothesis that if two fruit cannot be paired, one can learn by a fortiori inference that the fruit cannot be paired with the mother.

דְּהָא פֶּרֶד בֶּן סוּסְיָא אֲחִי פִּרְדָּה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁמּוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וְאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם.

And this explanation must be true, as the case of a mule born of a donkey and a mare and which is the brother of a female mule proves. As here one fruit is permitted with the other fruit, i.e., one may mate the male and female mules since they are of the same species, and yet the fruit is prohibited to be mated with the mother, i.e., the mare. This case illustrates that the prohibition of crossbreeding is contingent on paternity, and does not rest solely on the relation between the mother and the fruit.

אֶלָּא אָמַר מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, עֶבֶד בֶּן שִׁפְחָה אֲחִי מְשׁוּחְרֶרֶת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם!

Rather, Mar, son of Ravina, said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say that the case of a male Canaanite slave born of a female slave and who is the brother of a female freed slave proves it invalid. As here the fruit is prohibited with the fruit, i.e., the slave may not engage in sexual intercourse with his freed sister, and yet the fruit is permitted with his slave mother.

הָתָם גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר הוּא דְּקָא גָרֵים, דְּהָא עֶבֶד בֶּן מְשׁוּחְרֶרֶת אֲחִי שִׁפְחָה יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁמּוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וְאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם.

The Gemara rejects this as well: There it is the bill of manumission that effects the prohibition. The slave is prohibited to his sister only because she has been freed, not because they are both fruit of one mother, as the case of a male slave, son of a female freed slave, and the brother of a female slave proves. As here the fruit is permitted with the fruit, i.e., he is permitted to his sister, since they are both slaves, and yet the fruit is prohibited with his released mother, as she is now considered a full-fledged Jew. Clearly the prohibition is entirely contingent on the emancipation of one of the slaves, irrespective of their relationship.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, כִּלְאֵי זְרָעִים יוֹכִיחוּ, שֶׁאָסוּר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי, וּמוּתָּר פְּרִי עִם הָאֵם. כְּלוּם נֶאֱסָר פְּרִי עִם פְּרִי אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי הָאֵם? דְּהָא חִיטֵּי וּשְׂעָרֵי בְּכַדָּא וְלָא מִיתַּסְרוּ.

Rather, Rav Idi bar Avin said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say that the case of diverse kinds of seeds proves it invalid. As it is prohibited to sow fruit of one species with fruit of another species, and yet it is permitted to sow all types of fruit with the mother, i.e., the ground, from which all fruit grows. The Gemara rejects this as well: Isn’t fruit of one species with fruit of another species prohibited only by means of the mother, i.e., the ground? The prohibition of sowing diverse seeds applies only when they are both sown in the ground, as wheat and barley can be placed in a single jug and they are not prohibited.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, מָה לִפְרִי עִם פְּרִי, שֶׁכֵּן שְׁנֵי גּוּפִים, תֹּאמַר בִּפְרִי עִם הָאֵם, שֶׁכֵּן גּוּף אֶחָד, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: The a fortiori inference is invalid because one can say: What is unique about fruit with fruit, e.g., the kid and its mother’s milk, which are prohibited for cooking together? They are unique in that they are two separate bodies that were never unified. Must you say the same prohibition of pairing applies to the fruit with the mother, i.e., the mother’s meat and its milk, which were once one body? Due to this reason, the extra verse stating: “In its mother’s milk,” was necessary to include the meat and milk of the same animal in the prohibition.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִנַּיִן לְבָשָׂר בְּחָלָב שֶׁאָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תֹאכַל כׇּל תּוֹעֵבָה״ – כֹּל שֶׁתִּעַבְתִּי לָךְ הֲרֵי הוּא בְּבַל תֹּאכַל.

§ Rav Ashi says: From where is it derived that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for consumption, even though the verse explicitly prohibits only cooking? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated elsewhere: “You shall not eat any abominable thing” (Deuteronomy 14:3). This verse teaches that with regard to any practice that I have made abominable, i.e., forbidden, to you, the product is prohibited for consumption.

וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא בַּאֲכִילָה, בַּהֲנָאָה מִנַּיִן? כִּדְרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא יֹאכַל״, ״לֹא תֹאכַל״, ״לֹא תֹּאכְלוּ״ – אֶחָד אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה וְאֶחָד אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה בַּמַּשְׁמָע, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁפָּרַט לְךָ בִּנְבֵלָה לַגֵּר בִּנְתִינָה וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה.

And I have derived only that meat cooked in milk is prohibited with regard to consumption; from where do I derive that it is also prohibited with regard to benefit? It is derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated, “He shall not eat,” or “you,” in the singular, “shall not eat,” or “you,” in the plural, “shall not eat,” both a prohibition against eating and a prohibition against deriving benefit are indicated. This is so unless the verse specifies for you that one may derive benefit, in the manner that it specified for you with regard to an animal carcass, from which the verse explicitly permits one to derive benefit, as it states: “You may sell it to a foreigner” (Deuteronomy 14:21). Accordingly, one may provide such meat to a gentile resident alien in Eretz Yisrael by giving it to him as a gift, and to any other gentile by sale.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇּל נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ אוֹ מָכוֹר לְנׇכְרִי״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא לְגֵר בִּנְתִינָה, וּלְגוֹי בִּמְכִירָה; לְגֵר בִּמְכִירָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לַגֵּר תִּתְּנֶנָּה אוֹ מָכוֹר״.

As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal carcass; you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God.” From this verse I have derived only that it is permitted to provide such meat to a resident alien through giving and to a gentile through selling. From where is it derived that it is permitted to transfer an unslaughtered animal to a resident alien through selling as well? The verse states: “You may give it to the stranger…or you may sell it,” indicating that one has the option to do either of these.

לְגוֹי בִּנְתִינָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תִּתְּנֶנָּה… אוֹ מָכוֹר לְנׇכְרִי״. נִמְצָא אֶחָד גֵּר וְאֶחָד גּוֹי, בֵּין בִּמְכִירָה בֵּין בִּנְתִינָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: דְּבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן, לְגֵר בִּנְתִינָה וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה.

The baraita continues: From where is it derived that it is permitted to a gentile through giving as well? The verse states: “You may give it…or you may sell it to a foreigner.” Consequently, one finds that he may transfer an animal carcass to both a resident alien and a gentile, both through selling or through giving. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: These matters are to be understood as they are written; one may transfer an unslaughtered animal carcass to a resident alien only through giving, and to a gentile only through selling.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כִּדְקָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר, לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תֹאכְלוּ כׇל נְבֵלָה לַגֵּר אֲשֶׁר בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ תִּתְּנֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ וּמָכוֹר״ – ״אוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לִדְבָרִים כִּכְתָבָן הוּא דַּאֲתָא: לְגֵר בִּנְתִינָה, וְלַגּוֹי בִּמְכִירָה.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yehuda holds that if it enters your mind to understand the verse in accordance with that which Rabbi Meir says, then let the Merciful One write: You shall not eat of any animal carcass, you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates that he may eat it and also you may sell it to a foreigner. Why do I need the word “or” between these two options? Learn from it that it comes to teach that the matters are to be understood as they are written: To a resident alien through giving alone, and to any other gentile through selling.

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר אָמַר לָךְ: הַאי ״אוֹ״ לְהַקְדִּים נְתִינָה דְּגֵר לִמְכִירָה דְּגוֹי. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לְהַקְדִּים נְתִינָה דְגֵר לִמְכִירָה דְּגוֹי לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, סְבָרָא הוּא: זֶה אַתָּה מְצוֶּּוה לְהַחְיוֹתוֹ, וְזֶה אִי אַתָּה מְצוֶּּוה לְהַחֲיוֹתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir explain the wording of the verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir could say to you that this word “or” teaches one to prioritize to giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the priority of giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile does not require a verse, as it is based on logical reasoning: You are commanded by the Torah to sustain this resident alien, but you are not commanded to sustain that gentile.

(סִימָן: שַׁבָּת, חוֹרֵשׁ, וְכִלְאֵי זְרָעִים, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, וְשִׁילּוּחַ הַקֵּן).

§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic device for the topics that will be discussed: Shabbat; plows; and diverse kinds of seeds; a mother and its offspring; and sending away of the mother bird from the nest.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה,

Rav Ashi stated above that the product of any practice described in the Torah as abominable is prohibited for consumption. The Gemara asks: If that is so,