Keritot 10

בְּטוּמְאָה מָה לִי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה? מִי אָמְרִינַן: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וָלָד שֵׁנִי כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן קׇרְבָּן, כֵּיוָן דְּלֹא יָצְאָה שָׁעָה שֶׁרְאוּיָה לְהַקְרִיב בָּהּ קׇרְבָּן, הוֹאִיל וְכֵן – וָלָד שֵׁנִי כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן טוּמְאָה וְטׇהֳרָה, אֵימָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ כְּמַאן דְּאִיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, וּמַפְסְקָא טוּמְאָה דְּשֵׁנִי, וּמְמַלֵּא יוֹמֵי טׇהֳרָה דְּרִאשׁוֹן וַהֲדַר (מוֹנֶה) [מָנֵי לֵיהּ] יוֹמֵי,

Concerning ritual impurity, what does Rabbi Yehuda say? Do we say that Rabbi Yehuda says that the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist only with regard to the matter of an offering? In other words, since the time in which it was possible to sacrifice an offering for the second fetus had not yet emerged, since that is so, the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist. But concerning the matter of ritual impurity and purity, we say that he holds that it is considered as something that does exist, and accordingly, the days of impurity brought on by the second birth interrupt the days of purity following the first birth. The woman must therefore observe the days of impurity for the second birth, and afterward she completes the days of purity for the first birth, and then counts the days of purity brought on by the second fetus.

אוֹ דִלְמָא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה חוּמְרָא הוּא דְּאִית לֵיהּ, אֲבָל הָכָא – קוּלָּא הוּא, וְקוּלָּא לֵית לֵיהּ.

Or perhaps, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the second offspring is considered as though it exists only where there is a stringency that results from that definition. But here, if the woman would complete the days of purity of the first birth after the days of impurity of the second, this is a leniency, as she is deemed pure even if she sees blood during these days, and therefore, perhaps Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that the offspring is considered existent where this results in a leniency.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא מִסּוּרָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: יוֹלֶדֶת, שׁוֹחֲטִין וְזוֹרְקִין עָלֶיהָ בְּיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים לַזָּכָר וּבְיוֹם שְׁמוֹנִים לַנְּקֵבָה.

Rav Huna from Sura said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: In the case of a woman after childbirth, one slaughters the Paschal offering and sprinkles its blood on her account on the fourteenth of Nisan, if this occurs on the fortieth day after giving birth to a male or on the eightieth day after giving birth to a female. Although she is still impure at the time of the sacrifice, she will be able to partake of the Paschal offering on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan.

עַד כָּאן? טְמֵאָה הִיא! וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: וָלָד שֵׁנִי כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי.

The Sages challenged this baraita: Is that so? But she is still impure on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan, and she may not partake of sacrificial meat until she brings her offering on the forty-first day for a male or the eighty-first day for a female. And Rav Ḥisda said in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the second offspring is deemed as though it does not exist. The baraita is dealing with a case where the woman gave birth to two male offspring on two consecutive days, and the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on the fortieth day after the birth of the second offspring, which is the forty-first day following the birth of the first.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּטוּמְאָה סְבִירָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וָלָד שֵׁנִי כְּמַאן דְּאִיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, הֵיכִי שָׁחֲטִינַן עֲלַהּ בְּיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים? לְאוּרְתָּא נָמֵי לָא מָצְיָא אָכְלָה! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינָּה: לְטׇהֳרָה וּלְטוּמְאָה סְבִירָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וָלָד שֵׁנִי כְּמַאן דְּלֵיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי!

And if you say that concerning impurity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as though it is extant, which means that the days of purity following the first birth are delayed by the second birth and the mother does not become pure until the second term is complete, how may one slaughter the Paschal offering on her account on the fortieth day? After all, in the evening of the fifteenth she also may not eat the Paschal offering, because only forty days will have passed from the time of the second birth, and she would still be impure. Rather, must one not conclude from it that concerning ritual purity and impurity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as though it does not exist?

לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: לְטוּמְאָה וּלְטׇהֳרָה סְבִירָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה דְּוָלָד שֵׁנִי כְּמַאן דְּאִיתֵיהּ דָּמֵי, וְכִי תַנְיָא הַהִיא – בְּפֶסַח הַבָּא בְּטוּמְאָה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you: Even concerning impurity and purity, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the second offspring is considered as something that does exist; and when that baraita is taught, it is dealing with a case of a woman who gave birth to one child, and it is referring to a case of a Paschal offering that is brought in impurity. When the majority of a community is impure, the Paschal offering is brought even in impurity.

וּמִי אָכְלָה? וְהָתְנַן: פֶּסַח הַבָּא בְּטוּמְאָה, לֹא יֹאכְלוּ מִמֶּנּוּ זָבִים וְזָבוֹת, נִדּוֹת וְיוֹלְדוֹת!

The Gemara objects: And in that case, does she partake of it, as the baraita suggests? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pesaḥim 95b): With regard to a Paschal offering brought in impurity, men who experience a gonorrhea-like discharge [zavim], women who experience a discharge of uterine blood after their menstrual periods [zavot], menstruating women, and women after childbirth may not partake of it?

הָהִיא, לָא אָכְלָן כִּי לָא טְבִילָן. כִּי תַּנְיָא הַהִיא דְּשׁוֹחֲטִין וְזוֹרְקִין עָלֶיהָ, דְּהָא טָבְלָה. אִי הָכִי, מִשְּׁמִינִי דִּילַיהּ הוּא דְּחַזְיָא!

The Gemara explains: In that case, they do not partake of it because they did not immerse themselves in a ritual bath. But when that mishna is taught, that one slaughters the Paschal offering and sprinkles its blood on her account, the reason is that she had already immersed herself on the eighth day after giving birth. The Gemara objects: If that is so, then it is from the eighth day following his birth that she is fit to eat a Paschal offering brought in impurity, and there is no reason for the baraita to specify that the offering is slaughtered on the fortieth day.

מִשְּׁמִינִי לָא חַזְיָא, קָסָבַר: טְבוּל יוֹם דְּזָב – כְּזָב דָּמֵי.

The Gemara explains: Actually, she is not fit from the eighth day, because the tanna maintains that a zav who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed is considered to have the status of a zav and may not partake of a Paschal offering brought in ritual impurity. Similarly, a woman who immerses after giving birth is considered like one who immersed that day, and therefore she cannot partake of sacrificial meat until the end of the forty-day period.

אִי הָכִי, בְּיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים נָמֵי לָא חַזְיָא! לָאיֵי, בְּיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים חַזְיָא, קָסָבַר: מְחוּסַּר כִּפּוּרִים דְּזָב – לָאו כְּזָב דָּמֵי.

The Gemara objects: If that is so, then on the fortieth day she is also not fit to eat the Paschal offering. The Gemara explains: This is not so; on the fortieth day she is fit to partake of the Paschal offering after nightfall, because the tanna holds that a zav who has immersed himself and waited for nightfall but is lacking atonement, i.e., he has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, is not considered to have the status of a zav. Therefore, after completing the purification period, the woman may partake of the offering, despite the fact that she has not yet brought her atonement offering.

וּלְרָבָא, דְּאָמַר מְחוּסַּר כִּפּוּרִים דְּזָב כְּזָב דָּמֵי, הָא מַתְנִייתָא הֵיכִי מְתָרֵץ לַהּ? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: רָבָא מְתָרֵץ לַהּ בְּיוֹם אַרְבָּעִים לִיצִירַת זָכָר וּבְיוֹם שְׁמוֹנִים לִיצִירַת נְקֵבָה, וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לְזָכָר אַרְבָּעִים וְאֶחָד, לִנְקֵבָה שְׁמוֹנִים וְאֶחָד.

The Gemara asks: But according to Rava, who says that a zav who is lacking atonement is considered to have the status of a zav, how does he resolve the problem in this baraita? Rav Ashi said that Rava resolves it as follows: The baraita is not referring to the fortieth day after the birth of a male, but to a miscarriage that occurred on the fortieth day after the conception of a male, or the eightieth day after the conception of a female. And it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that it takes forty-one days for a male fetus to be formed, and eighty-one days for a female fetus to be formed. Since the miscarriage occurred before the forty-first or eighty-first day, it does not render the woman impure with the impurity of childbirth, and therefore she may partake of the Paschal offering.

סוֹף סוֹף, תִּיפּוֹק לִי דִּטְמֵאָה הִיא מִשּׁוּם נִדָּה! – בְּלֵידָה יַבִּישְׁתָּא. אִי הָכִי, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אִי אֶפְשָׁר לִפְתִיחַת הַקֶּבֶר בְּלֹא דָּם, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּאֶפְשָׁר לִפְתִיחַת הַקֶּבֶר בְּלֹא דָּם.

The Gemara objects: But ultimately, one should conclude that she is impure because she has the status of a menstruating woman. The Gemara explains: The mishna was stated with regard to the case of a dry birth, in which no blood was expelled, and therefore no impurity imparted. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then what is the purpose of stating it? The ruling in such a case is obvious. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state it, lest you say that it is impossible for the womb to open without blood being expelled. The tanna therefore teaches us that it is possible for the womb to open without blood being expelled. Accordingly, Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the impurity of a second birth cannot be deduced from this mishna.

אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמַעְיָה, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״שִׁשִּׁים״, יָכוֹל בֵּין רְצוּפִין בֵּין מְפוּזָּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יוֹם״, מָה יוֹם רָצוּף – אַף שִׁשִּׁים כּוּלָּן רְצוּפִין. מַנִּי? אִלֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, מִי אִית [לְהוּ] לְרַבָּנַן מְפוּזָּרִין?

Rabbi Shemaya said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: The verse states with regard to a woman who gave birth to a female: “And she shall continue in the blood of purification sixty days and six days” (Leviticus 12:5). One might have thought that she counts the days whether they are continuous or dispersed. Therefore, the verse states: “Sixty days and six days,” to teach that just as a day is a continuous time period, so too all sixty days are continuous. And whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? This is not the case, as the Rabbis count the days of purification from the second birth.

אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וּמִדְּקָא יָהֵיב לַהּ שִׁשִּׁים רְצוּפִים בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, שְׁמַע מִינָּה חוּמְרָא אִית לֵיהּ, לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה קוּלָּא לֵית לֵיהּ!

Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And from the fact that he prescribes for her sixty continuous days to be counted together, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the second offspring is considered extant only where a stringency results, but where a leniency results, in that she continues counting the days of purity of the first birth after completing the days of impurity for the second birth, he does not maintain that the second offspring is considered as though it exists.

לָא, לְעוֹלָם רַבָּנַן הִיא. וְהָכָא בְמַאי עָסְקִינַן – לְיוֹלֶדֶת זָכָר מִתּוֹךְ שְׁמוֹנִים שֶׁל נְקֵבָה.

The Gemara rejects this proof: No, actually, the baraita is stated in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a woman who gives birth to a male within the eighty-day period following the birth of a female, so that the forty-day period for the male is entirely subsumed within the purification period for the female. In such a case, even the Rabbis would maintain that the second birth does not interrupt the term following the first. She would observe the seven days of impurity for the male, and then complete the days of purity for the female. Consequently, the verse teaches that the sixty-six days of purity following the first birth are observed continuously, and there is no need to observe additional days due to the intervening days of impurity.

סוֹף סוֹף, שָׁלְמִין יוֹמֵי דְּקַדְמָאָה, וְעַד כָּאן דְּבָתְרָאָה לָא שָׁלְמִין, דְּהָא רַבָּנַן לְוָלָד שֵׁנִי מָנוּ! אֶלָּא מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ לְרַבָּנַן – בְּיוֹלֶדֶת תְּאוֹמִים, נְקֵבָה קַדְמָיְיתָא וְזָכָר בָּתְרָאָה, וּכְגוֹן דִּילֵידְתֵּיהּ לְזָכָר בָּתְרָאָה בְּעֶשְׂרִים לְיוֹמֵי טׇהֳרָה, דְּבָעֲיָא מִינְקָט לֵיהּ שִׁבְעָה יוֹמֵי טוּמְאָה דְּלֵידָה (תאומים נקבה),

The Gemara objects: But ultimately, this scenario is impossible; the reason is that the days of the first birth are completed while the days of the latter birth are not completed, as the Rabbis count the days following the second birth, and therefore the term relating to the first birth is abandoned. The Gemara offers a different explanation of the baraita: Rather, you find a case of counting dispersed days according to the Rabbis in a case where a woman gives birth to twins, first a female and then a male, and for example, she gives birth to the latter offspring, the male, on the twentieth day of the days of purity for the female, as she is required to observe for him seven days of impurity for birth.

וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: יָכוֹל הֵיכָא דְּיָלְדָה תְּאוֹמִים, נְקֵבָה מֵעִיקָּרָא וְזָכָר לְבַסּוֹף, תַּפְסֵיק טוּמְאָה דְּלֵידָה בְּמִיצְעֵי, וְנִימְנֵי לַהּ שִׁשָּׁה וְשִׁשִּׁים מְפוּזָּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יוֹם״, מָה יוֹם כּוּלּוֹ רָצוּף – אַף שִׁשִּׁים כּוּלָּם רְצוּפִין.

The Gemara explains: And this is what the baraita is saying: One might have thought that where she gave birth to twins, a female initially and a male afterward, that the impurity of the second birth interrupts the term following the first birth in the middle, and she counts sixty-six dispersed days. Therefore, the verse states: “Sixty days and six days,” to teach that just as a day is an entirely continuous time period, so too all sixty days are to be continuous. Since the baraita could be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, no proof can be inferred with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״שְׁלֹשִׁים״ – יָכוֹל בֵּין רְצוּפִין בֵּין מְפוּזָּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״יוֹם״, מָה יוֹם כּוּלּוֹ רָצוּף – אַף שְׁלֹשִׁים רְצוּפִין. מַנִּי הָא? אִלֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, וּמִי אִית לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita which discusses a woman who gave birth to a male. The verse states: “And she shall continue in the blood of purification three days and thirty days” (Leviticus 12:4). One might have thought that she counts the days whether they are continuous or dispersed. Therefore, the verse states: “Three days and thirty days,” to teach that just as a day is an entirely continuous time period, so too all thirty days are to be continuous. And whose opinion is this? If we say it is the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that

מְפוּזָּרִין? הָא אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן: לְוָלָד שֵׁנִי מָנְיָא! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: חוּמְרָא אִית לֵיהּ, קוּלָּא לֵית לֵיהּ.

it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? No, as the Rabbis say that she counts the days from the birth of the second fetus. Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And therefore, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that the second offspring is considered as though it exists only where a stringency results, but where a leniency results, he is not of the opinion that the second offspring is considered to have existed.

וְעוֹד אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״וְשֵׁשֶׁת יָמִים״ – יָכוֹל בֵּין רְצוּפִין וּבֵין מְפוּזָּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שִׁשִּׁים״, מָה שִׁשִּׁים כּוּלָּן רְצוּפִין – אַף שִׁשָּׁה כּוּלָּן רְצוּפִין. מַנִּי? אִלֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, מִי אִית לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן מְפוּזָּרִין? הָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן: לְוָלָד שֵׁנִי מָנְיָא!

And further, Rav Ashi said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita, which discusses the verse: “Sixty days and six days” (Leviticus 12:5). One might have thought that she counts these six days whether they are continuous or dispersed, so that if, for example, she miscarried on the sixty-third day, she would complete the remaining three days of purity for the first fetus after completing the period of purification for the second. Therefore, the verse states: “Sixty” to teach that just as the sixty days are all continuous, so too, the six days are all continuous. Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, that cannot be correct, as are the Rabbis of the opinion that it is possible for a woman who gave birth to count dispersed days? Didn’t the Rabbis say that she counts for the second offspring?

אֶלָּא לָאו רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: חוּמְרָא אִית לֵיהּ, קוּלָּא לֵית לֵיהּ? שְׁמַע מִינָּה.

Rather, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? And therefore, may one conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that the second offspring is considered extant only where a stringency results; but where a leniency results, he is not of the opinion that the second offspring is considered to have existed? The Gemara rules: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the case.

מַתְנִי׳ אֵלּוּ מְבִיאִין קׇרְבָּן עוֹלֶה וְיוֹרֵד: עַל שְׁמִיעַת קוֹל, וְעַל בִּטּוּי שְׂפָתָיִם, וְעַל טוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו, וְהַיּוֹלֶדֶת, וְהַמְצוֹרָע.

MISHNA: These are the five situations mentioned in the mishna (9a) in which one brings a sliding-scale offering: For hearing the voice of an oath, i.e., where one took a false oath that he does not have any testimony to provide on a given issue; and for the utterance of the lips, which is a case where one took a false oath about a different matter; and for the defiling of the Temple, by entering it while ritually impure, or defiling its sacrificial foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure; and a woman after childbirth; and a leper at the end of his purification process.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יֵשׁ מֵבִיא בְּדַלּוּת וַעֲשִׁירוּת, וְיֵשׁ מֵבִיא בְּדַלּוּת וְיֵשׁ מֵבִיא בְּדַלֵּי דַלּוּת:

GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita with regard to the nature of a sliding-scale offering, which varies depending on the owner’s financial status: There is a case in which one brings the offering in one of two possible states, either a bird offering if the individual is in a state of poverty or an animal offering if he is in a state of wealth; and there is a case in which one brings the offering in one of three possible states, of wealth, of poverty, or of extreme poverty.

יוֹלֶדֶת – מְבִיאָה בְּדַלּוּת וַעֲשִׁירוּת. מְצוֹרָע – מֵבִיא בְּדַלּוּת. שְׁמִיעַת הַקּוֹל וּבִטּוּי שְׂפָתָיִם וְטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו – מְבִיאִין בְּדַלּוּת וְדַלֵּי דַלּוּת.

The Gemara elaborates: A woman after childbirth brings a sliding-scale offering either in poverty, i.e., two doves or two pigeons, one as a burnt offering and one as a sin offering, or in wealth, i.e., a lamb as a burnt offering and a dove or a pigeon as a sin offering (see Leviticus 12:1–8). A leper brings the offering either in poverty in the form of a lamb for a guilt offering, and two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering, or in wealth in the form of a lamb for a guilt offering, a lamb as a burnt offering, and a female lamb as a sin offering (see Leviticus 14:10–22). For the hearing of the voice, i.e., taking a false oath that one cannot provide testimony, or the utterance of the lips, or the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, one brings an offering either in wealth, i.e., a female lamb or goat as a sin offering, or in poverty, i.e., two doves or two pigeons, one as a sin offering and one as a burnt offering, or in extreme poverty, i.e., a meal offering.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: יֵשׁ מֵבִיא אֶחָד תַּחַת אֶחָד, יֵשׁ מֵבִיא שְׁנַיִם תַּחַת שְׁנַיִם, יֵשׁ מֵבִיא שְׁנַיִם תַּחַת אֶחָד, יֵשׁ מֵבִיא אֶחָד תַּחַת שְׁנַיִם, מִכָּאן אַתָּה לָמֵד לַעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה בִּפְרוּטָה.

It is taught in another baraita: When offerings are brought in poverty rather than wealth, there is a case in which one brings one offering instead of a different one; there is a case in which one brings two offerings instead of two other offerings; there is a case in which one brings two offerings instead of one offering; and there is a case in which one brings one offering instead of two offerings. From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta.

יוֹלֶדֶת מְבִיאָה אַחַת תַּחַת אַחַת – פְּרִידָה אַחַת וָעוֹף תַּחַת כֶּבֶשׂ, מְצוֹרָע – שְׁתֵּי פְרִידִין תַּחַת שְׁנֵי כְבָשִׂים, שְׁמִיעַת הַקּוֹל וּבִטּוּי שְׂפָתָיִם וְטוּמְאַת מִקְדָּשׁ וְקָדָשָׁיו – מְבִיאִין שְׁתֵּי פְרִידִין תַּחַת כִּבְשָׂה אַחַת, וּמְבִיאִין בְּדַלֵּי דַלּוּת עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה תַּחַת שְׁתֵּי פְרִידִין.

A woman after childbirth brings one offering instead of one offering: One young bird, as a sin offering that she would bring even in wealth, and another bird as a burnt offering instead of the lamb. A leper brings two young birds instead of two lambs. For the hearing of the voice and the utterance of the lips and the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, one brings two young birds instead of one female lamb, and in a case of extreme poverty one brings one meal offering of one-tenth of an ephah instead of two young birds.

קָתָנֵי: מִכָּאן אַתָּה לָמֵד לַעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה שֶׁהִיא בִּפְרוּטָה. מְנָלַן? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי בְּסֶלַע לַמִּזְבֵּחַ״ – מֵבִיא כֶּבֶשׂ, שֶׁאֵין דָּבָר קָרֵב בְּסֶלַע אֶלָּא כֶּבֶשׂ.

The baraita teaches: From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta. The Gemara asks: From where do we learn this halakha? The Gemara answers that it is as the Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering worth one sela to the altar, he brings a lamb, as there is nothing that is sacrificed upon the altar that is worth one sela other than a lamb.

מִמַּאי? מִדְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״אֵיל אָשָׁם בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים״, מִכְּלָל דְּכֶבֶשׂ בֶּן שָׁנָה בְּסֶלַע, מִדִּכְתִיב ״כֶּבֶשׂ בֶּן שְׁנָתוֹ״. וּתְנַן: עָמְדוּ קִינִּין בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם בְּרִבְעָתַיִם.

From where is this halakha derived? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states in the Torah that the ram brought in its second year as a guilt offering must be “according to your valuation in silver by shekels” (Leviticus 5:15), i.e., it must be worth two sela. It may therefore be understood by inference that a lamb, i.e., a young ram, in its first year is worth one sela. And it is known that a lamb is brought when it is within its first year, as it is written: “A lamb of the first year” (Leviticus 12:6). And we learned in a mishna (8a): The price of nests, i.e., pairs of birds brought by an impoverished person instead of a lamb, stood that day at one-quarter of a silver dinar. A quarter-dinar is one-sixteenth of a sela, the price of a lamb.

וּמִדְּחָס רַחֲמָנָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּדַלּוּת לְמִיהְוֵי חַד מִשֵּׁית עֲשַׂר בַּעֲשִׁירוּת, חָס רַחֲמָנָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּדַלֵּי דַּלּוּת לְמִיהְוֵי חַד מִשֵּׁית עֲשַׂר בְּדַלּוּת.

And from the fact that the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in poverty, in that He permits him to bring an offering that is worth one-sixteenth of the value of the lamb that is brought in wealth, it may be inferred that the Merciful One takes pity upon one who brings an offering in extreme poverty, and consequently He permits him to bring an offering which is worth one-sixteenth of the value of the offering brought in moderate poverty. Accordingly, the offering brought in extreme poverty may be equal to a two hundred fifty-sixth part of the value of a sela.

אִם כֵּן, דַּלּוּת כְּמָה הָוְיָא – רִיבְעָא, וּכְמָה פְּרִיטֵי בְּרִיבְעָא – אַרְבָּעִים וּתְמָנְיָא פְּרִיטֵי, חַד מִשֵּׁית עֲשַׂר כְּמָה הָוֵי דְּדַלּוּת – תְּלָתָא פְּרִיטֵי.

The Gemara examines the mathematics necessary to determine that the value of the offering brought in extreme poverty is equal to one peruta: If so, how much is the offering brought in poverty worth? It is worth one-quarter of a dinar. And how many perutot are in one-quarter of a dinar? Forty-eight perutot. Accordingly, how many perutot are in the offering brought in extreme poverty, which is worth one-sixteenth of the offering brought in poverty? Three perutot.

דְּקָתָנֵי: מִכָּאן אַתָּה לָמֵד לַעֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה בִּפְרוּטָה, אַמַּאי פְּרוּטָה? הָאָמְרַתְּ: עֲשִׂירִית הָאֵיפָה דַּלֵּי דַּלּוּת הוּא, וְאָמְרַתְּ חַד מִשֵּׁית סְרֵי דְּדַלּוּת הוּא, דְּחָשְׁבִינַן דִּתְלָתָא פְּרִיטֵי הָוַיִין!

The Gemara objects: But with regard to that which the baraita teaches: From here you may derive that the offering of one-tenth of an ephah may be worth as little as one peruta, why did the baraita teach that it may be worth one peruta, rather than three perutot? Didn’t you say that one-tenth of an ephah is brought in extreme poverty, and you also said that this offering should be worth one-sixteenth of the offering brought in poverty, which we calculated to be three perutot?

תַּנָּא מִיּוֹלֶדֶת יָלֵיף, דְּמַתְיָא פְּרִידָה אַחַת תַּחַת כֶּבֶשׂ, דְּהָוֵי חַד מִתְּלָתִין וּתְרֵין דְּכֶבֶשׂ. וְעַד כָּאן, דַּלֵּי דַּלּוּת כְּמָה הָוֵי – חַד מִשֵּׁית עֲשַׂר בְּדַלּוּת, דְּמֵהֵיכָא יָלֵיף – מִכֶּבֶשׂ וְאַיִל. עַד כָּאן, פְּרוּטָה וּפַלְגָא הָוֵי!

The Gemara answers: The tanna derives the cost of an offering brought in poverty from the case of a woman after childbirth, who brings one bird instead of a lamb, as a bird is worth one thirty-second of the value of a lamb. The Gemara asks: But until now, how much was the offering brought in extreme poverty calculated to be worth? One-sixteenth of the value of the offering brought in poverty. And from where is this derived? It is derived from the value of the lamb and the ram, as explained earlier. If so, until now, the calculations lead to the conclusion that the offering brought in extreme poverty is worth one and one-half perutot, as one thirty-second of the value of a lamb is equal to one-eighth of a silver dinar rather than one-quarter, which means that the offering brought in poverty is worth twenty-four perutot, one-sixteenth of which is equal to one and one-half perutot.

אָמַר רָבָא: כּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא מִיּוֹלֶדֶת יָלֵיף, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: מִדְּחָס רַחֲמָנָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּדַלּוּת לְמִיהְוֵי חַד מִתְּלָתִין וּתְרֵין בַּעֲשִׁירוּת, וּמַאי הִיא – יוֹלֶדֶת, הָכִי חָס רַחֲמָנָא עֲלֵיהּ דְּדַלֵּי דַּלּוּת לְמִיהְוֵי חַד מִן תְּלָתִין וּתְרֵין בְּדַלּוּת.

Rather, Rava said a different answer: The entire matter is derived from the offering brought by a woman after childbirth, and this is what the tanna is saying: It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in poverty, in that he may bring an offering which is worth one thirty-second of the value of the offering brought in wealth. Rava adds parenthetically: And from what case is this principle derived? From the case of a woman after childbirth. So too, the Merciful One has mercy upon one who brings an offering in extreme poverty, in that he may bring an offering that is worth one thirty-second of the value of the offering brought in moderate poverty.

אִי הָכִי, נְכֵי רִיבְעָא דִּפְרוּטָה הָוֵי! הָכִי נָמֵי, אֶלָּא דְּלָאו אוֹרַח אַרְעָא לְאֵיתוֹיֵי פָּחוֹת מִפְּרוּטָה לַמָּקוֹם.

The Gemara objects: If so, the value should be one peruta minus one-quarter, i.e., three-quarters of a peruta. The Gemara explains: Indeed that is so, but it is not proper conduct to bring an offering worth less than one peruta before God.

מַתְנִי׳ מָה בֵּין שִׁפְחָה לְבֵין כׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת? שֶׁלֹּא שָׁוְותָה לָהֶן לֹא בָּעוֹנֶשׁ וְלֹא בַּקׇּרְבָּן. שֶׁכׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת בְּחַטָּאת, וְשִׁפְחָה בְּאָשָׁם. כׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת בִּנְקֵבָה, וְשִׁפְחָה בְּזָכָר.

MISHNA: What are the differences between an espoused maidservant and all those others with whom relations are forbidden? The difference is that the status of the maidservant is not equal to their status, neither with regard to punishment nor with regard to an offering, as one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering, and by contrast, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant is liable to bring a guilt offering. One who unwittingly engages in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden brings a female animal, and one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant brings a male animal, as a sin offering is a female and a guilt offering is a male.

כׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת אֶחָד הָאִישׁ וְאֶחָד הָאִשָּׁה שָׁוִין בַּמַּכּוֹת וּבַקׇּרְבָּן, וּבַשִּׁפְחָה לֹא הִשְׁוָה לֹא הָאִישׁ לָאִשָּׁה בַּמַּכּוֹת, וְלֹא הִשְׁוָה אִשָּׁה לָאִישׁ בַּקׇּרְבָּן.

Furthermore, with regard to engaging in intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, both the man and the woman are equal with regard to liability to receive lashes if they were forewarned, and with regard to liability to bring an offering if they did so unwittingly. And in the case of one who engages in intercourse with a maidservant, the Torah did not equate the man with the woman with regard to lashes, as she alone is flogged, as will be explained, and the Torah did not equate the woman with the man with regard to bringing an offering, as she does not bring an offering.

כׇּל הָעֲרָיוֹת עָשָׂה בָּהֶן אֶת הַמְעָרֶה כְּגוֹמֵר, וְחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל בִּיאָה וּבִיאָה.

With regard to intercourse with any of those with whom relations are forbidden, the Torah rendered the halakhic status of one who engages in the initial stage of intercourse [hame’areh] to be like that of one who completes the act, and one is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every act of intercourse that he performs unwittingly. By contrast, in the case of relations with an espoused maidservant, one is liable only for completing the act of intercourse, and the man brings a single offering for several transgressions.

(זוֹ חוֹמֶר) הֶחְמִיר בְּשִׁפְחָה,

This is a stringency that the Torah imposed with regard to the maidservant relative to other individuals with whom relations are forbidden: