Nedarim 46

וּשְׁנֵיהֶם אֲסוּרִים לְהַעֲמִיד רֵיחַיִם וְתַנּוּר וּלְגַדֵּל תַּרְנְגוֹלִים.

And all agree that they are both prohibited from setting up a mill or an oven in the jointly owned courtyard, or to raise chickens in it.

הָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶם מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ — לֹא יִכָּנֵס לֶחָצֵר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר, יָכוֹל הוּא לוֹמַר לוֹ: לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלִּי אֲנִי נִכְנָס, וְאֵינִי נִכְנָס לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלְּךָ. וְכוֹפִין אֶת הַנּוֹדֵר לִמְכּוֹר אֶת חֶלְקוֹ.

If only one of the partners was prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the other, he may not enter the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: He can say to the partner: I am entering into my own portion and I am not entering into your portion. And the court forces the one who took such a vow to sell his portion so that he does not cause the other to transgress.

הָיָה אֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק מוּדָּר בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶם הֲנָאָה — לֹא יִכָּנֵס לֶחָצֵר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר, יָכוֹל לוֹמַר לוֹ: לְתוֹךְ שֶׁל חֲבֵירְךָ אֲנִי נִכְנָס, וְאֵינִי נִכְנָס לְתוֹךְ שֶׁלְּךָ.

If someone from the marketplace is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from one of the partners, he may not enter a courtyard of the partners, since it belongs partly to the one from whom he may not benefit. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: He can say to him: I am entering into the portion of another resident of the courtyard and I am not entering your own portion since it does not belong entirely to you.

הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְיֵשׁ לוֹ מֶרְחָץ וּבֵית הַבַּד מוּשְׂכָּרִין בָּעִיר, אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ בָּהֶן תְּפִיסַת יָד — אָסוּר, אֵין לוֹ בָּהֶן תְּפִיסַת יָד — מוּתָּר.

With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he has a bathhouse or an olive press in the city that is leased out and available for public use, if the one who took the vow has a right to profits from usage in the property, i.e., he retains some rights in the property and has not leased them out completely, it is forbidden for the one who took the vow to use it. If he has no right of usage in the property, it is permitted.

הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״קֻוֽנָּם לְבֵיתְךָ שֶׁאֲנִי נִכְנָס, וְשָׂדְךָ שֶׁאֲנִי לוֹקֵחַ״, מֵת אוֹ שֶׁמְּכָרוֹ לְאַחֵר — מוּתָּר. ״קֻוֽנָּם בַּיִת זֶה שֶׁאֲנִי נִכְנָס״, ״שָׂדֶה זוֹ שֶׁאֲנִי לוֹקֵחַ״, מֵת אוֹ שֶׁמְּכָרוֹ לְאַחֵר — אָסוּר.

With regard to one who says to another: Entering your house is konam for me, or: Purchasing your field is konam for me, then if he, i.e., the owner of the house or field, dies or sells the house to another, it is permitted for the one who took the vow to enter the house or purchase the field, as it is no longer in the possession of the prior owner. But if he said: Entering this house is konam for me, or: Purchasing this field is konam for me, then even if the owner dies or sells it to another, it is forbidden.

גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בְּנָדְרוּ פְּלִיגִי, הִדִּירוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה מַאי? מִי אָמְרִינַן: בְּנָדְרוּ הוּא דִּפְלִיגִי, אֲבָל בְּהִדִּירוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה — מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב דְּכִי אֲנוּסִין דָּמוּ. אוֹ דִילְמָא: אֲפִילּוּ בְּהִדִּירוּ זֶה אֶת זֶה פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן?

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the mishna, the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov disagree with regard to the permissibility of entering a jointly owned courtyard where the partners vowed not to derive benefit from one another. However, if they instead vowed to prohibit one another from deriving benefit from them and their property, what is the halakha? Do we say that they disagree where the partners each vowed not to benefit from the other, but where they each vowed to prohibit one another from deriving benefit from them, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as they are each considered to be forbidden due to circumstances beyond their control? Or perhaps the Rabbis disagree even in a case where each vowed to prohibit one another from deriving benefit?

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶן מוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, וּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן! תָּנֵי: נָדוּר מֵחֲבֵירוֹ הֲנָאָה.

Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If only one of the partners was prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the other, he may not enter the shared courtyard. Here, the prohibitive vow was stated by the other party, and still the Rabbis disagree and forbid the use of the courtyard. Evidently, the dispute in the mishna applies equally to cases beyond the control of the one forbidden by the vow. The Gemara responds: Teach an emended version of the mishna: If one had vowed to prohibit himself from deriving benefit from another. According to this emended version, the mishna may be addressing only the one who brought the prohibition upon himself.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְכוֹפִין אֶת הַנּוֹדֵר לִמְכּוֹר אֶת חֶלְקוֹ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא דִּנְדַר הוּא, הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי כּוֹפִין. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּאַדְּרֵיהּ, אַמַּאי כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ? הָא מֵינָס אֲנִיס?

So too, it is reasonable to assume that the mishna is referring to one who imposes the prohibition upon himself, as it was taught in the latter clause with regard to the same case: And the court forces the one who took such a vow to sell his portion. Granted, if you say that the mishna is speaking of a case where he himself vowed not to benefit from the other, this is consistent with that which teaches that the court forces him to sell his portion; since he created the problem, he is forced to resolve it. But if you say that it is referring to a case where the other prohibited him with a vow, why does the court force him to sell his property? He is put in a situation beyond his control. This clause offers no proof, and the Rabbis may still concede in a case where one is forbidden due to another’s vow.

אָמַר רַבָּה אָמַר זְעֵירִי:

Rabba said that Ze’eiri said:

מַחְלוֹקֶת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ כְּדֵי חֲלוּקָּה. אֲבָל אֵין בָּהּ כְּדֵי חֲלוּקָּה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר.

The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis is with regard to a courtyard where there is sufficient area in the courtyard for it to be divided into four square cubits for each partner, so each can be said to have a real portion that can be forbidden to the other. But if there is not sufficient area in it to be divided, everyone agrees that it is permitted to benefit from it, since the entire courtyard is viewed as belonging to both of them and each one can say that he is entering his own portion.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: הֲרֵי בֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת, דִּכְמִי שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ כְּדֵי חֲלוּקָּה דָּמֵי, וּתְנַן: שְׁנֵיהֶן אֲסוּרִין בְּדָבָר שֶׁל אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר!

Rav Yosef said to Rabba: A synagogue belongs to the entire public and is therefore considered like a courtyard in which there is not sufficient area in it to be divided, and we learned in a mishna later in the chapter (48a) that with regard to two people who vow not to derive benefit from each other, both are prohibited from deriving benefit from an entity belonging to that city such as a synagogue. Evidently, the Rabbis prohibit deriving benefit even from such entities.

אֶלָּא, אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף, אָמַר זְעֵירִי: מַחְלוֹקֶת שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ כְּדֵי חֲלוּקָּה, אֲבָל יֵשׁ בָּהּ כְּדֵי חֲלוּקָּה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר.

Rather, Rav Yosef said: Ze’eiri must have said: The dispute holds where there is not sufficient area in the courtyard for it to be divided, but if there is sufficient area in it for it to be divided, everyone agrees that it is forbidden, since if either enters it he may be entering the other’s portion.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב.

Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. And so too, Rabbi Elazar said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.

הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְיֵשׁ לוֹ שָׁם מֶרְחָץ וְכוּ׳. וְכַמָּה תְּפִיסַת יָד? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: לְמֶחֱצָה לִשְׁלִישׁ וְלִרְבִיעַ. אֲבָל בִּבְצִיר — לָא. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בִּבְצִיר — אָסוּר. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי דִּשְׁרֵי — דִּמְקַבֵּל בְּטַסְקָא.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he has a bathhouse or an olive press in the city that is leased out and available for public use, the forbidden party may use it only if the owner has forfeited his own right to profits from usage. The Gemara asks: And how much is this right to profits from usage that prohibits the subject of the vow from entering the bathhouse? Rav Naḥman said: In cases where he receives one half, one-third, or one-quarter of the profits of the bathhouse. But in a case where he receives less, it is not forbidden. Abaye said: Even in a case where he receives less, it is forbidden. If so, what are the circumstances in which it is permitted and he is not considered to have a right to profits from usage? Where he completely forfeits all profits and receives only an annual rental fee [taska] from a tenant.